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SUMMARY 
This working paper explores the governance of 
protracted displacement across global, regional and 
domestic levels in the context of the project “Trans-
national Figurations of Displacement” (TRAFIG). The 
multiple contemporary crises that have led to forced 
displacement show not only the limits of a tight defini-
tion of ‘refugee’ but also highlight the gaps in interna-
tional protection frameworks. A significant number of 
those forcibly displaced are in protracted displacement 
situations.
This paper is an effort to make sense of the legislative 
and policy frameworks of protection that apply glob-
ally, regionally and domestically, and the way in which 
these frameworks facilitate or hinder solutions for 
people in protracted displacement. We evaluate how 
these frameworks contribute (directly or indirectly) to 
resolving or creating protracted displacement, assess 
how they contribute to relevant policy developments 
and identify engagement trends and (unintended) 
effects. Along the way, we also draw comparative 
insights across different global, regional and domestic 
levels, including eight different countries that host large 
groups of displaced people and are the focus of the 
TRAFIG project: Greece, Germany and Italy in Europe; 
Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
and Tanzania in Africa; and Jordan and Pakistan in Asia.
We explore some selected gaps in the current systems 
of governance of displacement while concentrating 
on three key perspectives: governing protection, exer-
cising rights and accessing services, and mobility and 
transnational dimensions of displacement.  
We conclude with ten key messages regarding the 
shortcomings of the current governance system of 
displacement. They highlight the need for stronger 
stakeholder collaboration, integration of global and 
local policies, enhanced focus on IDPs, investment in 
progressive regional policies, redesign of EU policies to 
avoid promotion of protracted displacement, greater 
ownership of processes and resources, de-politicisation 
of displacement policies, alignment of durable solu-
tions with development-oriented interventions and 
realisation of the development potential of refugee 
integration. They also focus on mobility and translocal 
connectivity as a fourth durable solution to protracted 
displacement.
KEYWORDS
Protracted displacement; protracted refugee  
situations; refugees; IDPs; governance; mobility;  
social integration; economic impact
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Introduction
This working paper explores the governance of protracted dis-
placement at global, regional and domestic levels in the context 
of the project “Transnational Figurations of Displacement” 
(TRAFIG). The overall objective of TRAFIG is to contribute 
to the development of alternative solutions to protracted 
displacement that are better tailored to the needs and capaci-
ties of the persons affected. In our reading, current policies do 
not adequately address the challenge of forced displacement 
and, in particular, fail to offer long-term perspectives for those 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who live in 
situations of vulnerability, dependency and legal insecurity 
due to continuous cycles of displacement and a lack of durable 
solutions.1  Numerous studies have shown the significance 
of social networks and both intra-regional and international 
mobility for displaced persons (Etzold, Belloni, King, Kraler, & 
Pastore, 2019). Building on these insights, the project seeks to 
answer the questions whether and how protracted displacement, 
dependency and vulnerability are related to the factors of trans-
local connectivity and mobility, and, in turn, how connectivity 
and mobility can contribute to enhancing self-reliance and 
strengthening the resilience of displaced people.
The international community entrusts the main responsibility 
to enforce respect for people’s human rights to states. States are, 
above all, responsible for their own citizens, but also for people 
who are residing on their territory. To compensate for situations 
where a state is either not able or willing to guarantee human 
rights, the international community has developed a set of 
international agreements and entrusted international organisa-
tions with monitoring and advocating for their implementation. 
However, as pointed out by Kälin (2014), by virtue of state sov-
ereignty, the international community is not entitled to replace 
national authorities in carrying out certain tasks but may play a 
subsidiary role in supporting or complementing governmental 
protection. 
Formal governance structures usually address one or a limited 
number of displacement situations. They often respond to 
specific incidents or developments, and many governance 
structures derive from a ‘pre-globalised’ era. As a result, 
global governance frameworks may overlap or lack responses 
to current displacement challenges. Regional and/or national 
1 We use the word “refugees” in a generic way, including those who are legally 
recognised as refugees – either through individual refugee status determina-
tion or as prima facie refugees – and those who would be recognised as ref-
ugees or are considered refugees by UNHCR, thus covering those refugees in 
countries that are not signatories of the Refugee Convention or are signatories 
but apply a territorial restriction.
governance frameworks address some of the gaps in governing 
displacement at the global level; other gaps, however, remain. 
An ever-increasing number of displaced people are forced 
to navigate between strict and often artificial governance 
frameworks that may not offer (highly individual) protection 
needs and solutions. As a result, many displaced people find 
themselves—despite the good intentions of many actors—in 
protracted displacement and thus in situations in which their 
basic human rights remain unfulfilled.
This paper is an effort to make sense of the legislative and 
policy frameworks of protection that apply globally, regionally 
(in TRAFIG’s focal regions Europe, East Africa and the Horn 
of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia) and domestically 
(in our eight focal countries that host large groups of displaced 
people: Greece, Germany and Italy in Europe; Ethiopia, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Tanzania in 
Africa; and Jordan and Pakistan in Asia). 
We address the following questions:
•	 Who are the actors designing and implementing the protec-
tion of displaced people?
•	 How do legislative and policy frameworks facilitate or 
hinder solutions for displaced people and thus, how do they 
contribute (directly or indirectly) to resolving or protracting 
displacement situations? 
•	 Which are the most relevant policy developments and trends 
in humanitarian engagement, and what are their (unintended) 
effects? 
We developed our analysis against the background of the 
theoretical framework adopted by the TRAFIG project, reliant 
in particular on the notion of social figurations, as developed 
by the German sociologist Elias (Etzold et al., 2019). Conse-
quently, our particular focus will be on social figurations that 
are shaped at the meso-level of refugees’ and IDPs’ experiences 
and their families and networks. We also rely on the notion 
adopted by the TRAFIG project on what constitutes a situation 
of ‘limbo’, as referring to displaced persons being ‘immobi-
lised’ in specific places, such as camps or informal settlements, 
where they experience intractable phases of uncertainty, lack 
access to protection, legal status or basic services. Finally, we 
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address one of the hypothesis on which TRAFIG has been built, 
namely that mobility might be seen as a fourth durable solution, 
with people moving back and forth between their community of 
origin and their place of refuge, between urban and rural areas, 
and possibly between multiple countries (Etzold et al., 2019). 
The following sections provide an analysis of our subject-matter 
along the different global, regional and domestic levels explored 
in TRAFIG. It is based on the collation of key elements from 
a range of internal project reports.2  The first section explores 
the governance of displacement at the global and regional level. 
The second section moves on to concentrate on the governance 
of displacement in Europe, while the third section focuses on 
East Africa and the Horn of Africa, the fourth section on the 
Middle East, and the fifth section on South Asia. Finally, in the 
sixth section, we identify and discuss in greater depth some 
selected gaps in the current systems of governance of displace-
ment. 
Throughout the paper, we concentrate on three key perspectives: 
1.	 governing protection, by mapping relevant actors, legal 
frameworks and policies;
2.	 exercising rights and accessing services, by analysing pol-
icies, programmes and instruments that address protracted 
displacement from the viewpoint of rights and services;
3.	 mobility and transnational dimensions of displacement, 
by focussing on how existing policies, programmes and 
instruments influence displaced people’s mobility and their 
transnational networks and connections. 
Slightly greater focus will be on the European context in this 
paper, as other regions will be covered in more detail in other 
TRAFIG outputs. While IPDs constitute a policy challenge 
in several countries, in this paper we use the DR Congo as a 
particular example of policies affecting this group.
2 This working paper is based on internal reports on the governance of dis-
placement produced in relation to Greece (Thomas Goumenos and Panos 
Hatziprokopiou), Germany (Benjamin Etzold) and Italy (Emanuela Roman) 
in Europe; Ethiopia (Fekadu Adugna and Tekalign Ayalew), the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Carolien Jacobs) and Tanzania (Khoti Chilomba 
Kamanga) in Africa; Jordan (Ali M. Alodat and Fawwaz Ayoub Momani) and  
Pakistan (Muhammad Mudassar Javed) in Asia; European Union (Nuno 
Ferreira, Camilla Fogli, Pamela Kea, Albert Kraler, Marion Noack and Martin 
Wagner); Africa (Carolien Jacobs); and synthesis reports in relation to findings 
in non-EU countries (Carolien Jacobs), EU countries (Pamela Kea) and at the 
international level (Camilla Fogli, Maegan Hendow, Marion Noack and Martin 
Wagner). Nuno Ferreira collated the first version of this working paper.
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1.	Governing	displacement	in	the	
global	context
In examining the governance of forced displacement, we distin-
guish ‘governance’ from the closely related notion of ‘regime’ 
by its dynamic aspect as the act (or process) of governing 
collectively in the absence of a single superior authority—in the 
words of Rosenau and Czempiel (1992), of ‘governing without 
government’. Importantly, governance involves not only 
multiple actors but also multiple political levels of governance 
that operate at different geographical scales and with different 
scope: Global governance is both multi-level and multi-scalar 
and variable in scope and consistency. While one can identify 
a fairly coherent and enforced governance system for global 
trade, the displacement agenda, by contrast, lacks such clarity. 
Forced displacement is not covered all inclusively at the global 
level, but developed over the years as a piecemeal and highly 
fragmented area. As we will see, many protection gaps remain, 
particularly in relation to protracted displacement. 
With the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) on 10 December 1948, the United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly for the first time in human history de-
fined basic civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
that all human beings should enjoy. Since then, international 
human rights have developed further into a body of interna-
tional human rights that lay down obligations which states are 
bound to respect. By becoming parties to international treaties, 
states assume obligations and duties under international law 
to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. The obligation to 
protect requires states to take positive action to facilitate the en-
joyment of basic human rights. The duty to protect and a state’s 
responsibilities, however, fail in the face of situations where 
individuals are either unwilling or unable to avail themselves of 
the protection of the country of origin or habitual residence. 
This section looks into the international and regional legal 
instruments that are in place and evaluates how they address 
(or not) displacement. It provides some of the main features of 
the legal frameworks that shape the lives of displaced persons. 
These frameworks, despite all good intentions, might not al-
ways be applied, enforced or followed, certainly not in settings 
that “seldom realize the promises of protection” (Landau & 
Amit, 2014) or protect basic human rights.
Deriving from these introductory considerations, the section 
circumscribes the gaps and/or the malfunctions of global 
governance to—in a next step—see how regional or national 
responses fill the protection gaps or repeat (or even exacerbate) 
the gaps at those levels of governance
1.1	In	the	global	context
People have escaped war and persecution since the beginning 
of history, but it is not until the interwar period that an inter-
national legal and institutional protection framework was es-
tablished under the League of Nations. The notion of ‘refugee’ 
only then developed into a legal concept under international 
law. After World War II, efforts initially focused on providing 
assistance to displaced persons, but a new institutional and 
normative framework for the protection of refugees was only 
established with the creation of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 and the subsequent 
adoption of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Refugee Convention) (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1967). The Refugee Convention was a clear product 
of its time. In the face of the cruelties of the Nazi regime and 
World War II, it provided the first universal refugee definition. 
In contrast to the interwar refugee regime, the Refugee Conven-
tion follows an individualised and persecution-based approach 
to defining beneficiaries and their rights. 
The universal refugee concept enshrined in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention presented an enormous step forward for a global 
governance regime of international protection. Yet, its devel-
opment was a result of political compromise and so was the 
definition of whom this Convention shall apply to. Hathaway 
(2012) has pointed out that the refugee definition has shown 
resilience and a great deal of adaptability to contemporary ref-
ugee crises. Equally, Tuerk and Dowd (2014) have reminded us 
of the broad understanding of the refugee definition according 
to UNHCR. Although the Refugee Convention has been signed 
by 142 countries globally, the international protection regime 
has some deficiencies, some of which were addressed by other 
instruments, others remained unresolved.
Five key gaps in the international protection 
regime
First, the rather strict and, if read literally, very tight definition 
soon showed its limits when it came to situations of generalised 
violence or armed conflict producing large-scale displacement. 
Although UNHCR promotes an extensive understanding and 
interpretation of the refugee definition, it admits that many 
states interpret the refugee definition in a narrow sense and do 
not include generalised violence in the protection regime (Türk 
& Dowd, 2014). In the context of often violent processes of 
decolonisation and continuing civil strife in newly independent 
nations, the limits of the Refugee Convention became already 
apparent. While UNHCR assisted such refugees through its 
“good office function” (Holborn, 1975, p. 434), people escaping 
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Third, the geographic and time limitations of the Convention 
were introduced owing to the belief that the “refugee problem 
could be resolved in a foreseeable time”; it took until 1967 to 
acknowledge “that new refugee situations have arisen since 
the Convention was adopted” (Preamble to the 1967 Protocol). 
With the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(United Nations General Assembly, 1967), the time and geo-
graphic restrictions were lifted. Globally, 142 states are parties 
to both the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. None-
theless, Turkey which, for many years, was the leader world-
wide in hosting refugees, maintains the geographic limitations 
of the Convention. Other major refugee host countries, such as 
Lebanon, Jordan or Pakistan, acceded to neither the Convention 
nor its Protocol. 
Fourth, the refugee definition applies to individuals who are 
outside of their country of origin and thus excludes about 40 
million people who were forced to flee their place of origin 
but remained within their country of origin (UNHCR, 2019b). 
Internally displaced people (IDPs) arguably represent the 
most dominant group of people that fall outside any protection 
framework, evidently because—in theory—their country of 
origin remains the primary provider of protection and respon-
sible for providing access to basic human rights for its citizens 
and people staying on its territory. This was also the reason why 
internal displacement was only addressed at the end of the Cold 
War (Kälin, 2014). A first analysis of the legal norms addressing 
IDPs produced by the newly created UN Secretary on Inter-
nally Displaced Persons led to the development of the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, which, however, are not 
legally binding. Still, as the only continent that continued to ad-
dress internal displacement, Africa moved further by adopting 
the Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance 
to Internally Displaced Persons in 2006, obliging the 19 states 
conflicts did not enjoy the protection provided for by the Ref-
ugee Convention. In the African and American context, this 
protection gap led to the development of a regional protection 
regime, the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Con-
vention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Af-
rica (OAU Convention) and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration 
on Refugees (Jubilut, 2016). In the European context, regional 
protection safeguards were mainly developed under the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and, later, 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
Second, one of the key notions of the Refugee Convention 
prohibits the return (refoulement) of refugees to a country 
where their life or freedom would be threatened on account 
of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. The so-called non-refoulement 
principle only applied to people who fall within the definition of 
the Convention. It soon was extended to all people as a result of 
the prohibition of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, 
a principle enshrined in the 1986 Convention against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CAT) (by 30 September 2019, the CAT was 
ratified by 168 states), and regional human rights instruments 
like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). As 
a result, non-refoulement became a principle of international 
customary law. Yet, except for refugees, the non-refoulement 
principle only protected from expulsion. It did not necessarily 
trigger a positive protection status, including a defined set of 
legal rights as refugees enjoy them. As a consequence, it often 
left individuals in legal limbo and with only limited rights. 
A discussion of these gaps of access to basic human rights 
only began in the 1990s. Again, regional initiatives, such as 
the human rights protection framework under the ECHR, set 
the path for acknowledging rights also for complementary or 
subsidiary protection.
© BICC: Benjamin	Etzold,	Vincent	Glasow
Map	1:	States	parties	to	the	1951	Refugee	Convention
© ICMPD, Marion Noack, Martin Wagner
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fall within the definition of a refugee in the Refugee Conven-
tion, e.g. internally displaced persons (Aleinikoff, 2018). All 
these identified challenges translate into protection gaps and 
thus solution gaps for displaced people. In addition, the parallel 
existence of the Migration Compact received some criticism, 
as many refugees and those in similar situations may never be 
formally recognised as refugees and thus rely on the regular 
migration system (Costello, 2018).
Refugees typically arrive in more vulnerable circumstances 
than other immigrants do: They often do not speak the language 
of the host country, have fewer economic resources, more lim-
ited social support networks, and are more likely to have been 
exposed to trauma before and during migration (Hynie, 2018). 
Despite these difficulties, the ultimate goal of refugee protec-
tion remains to end the cycle of displacement so that refugees 
can live ‘normal lives’. To achieve this goal, three solutions 
have emerged: return, local integration and resettlement. The 
Refugee Compact identifies the facilitation of access to durable 
solutions as one of its “primary objectives”.3  Specifically, 
while reiterating the need to expand the application of each of 
the three traditional solutions, the Refugee Compact calls for 
innovation—referred to as “complementary pathways to pro-
tection”—in the form of new varieties of the three traditional 
alternatives, or in combining various elements, while fully 
upholding the fundamental protections codified in international 
refugee law.
Recent trends underline the challenge. There has been quite a 
significant increase over recent years in the number of ref-
ugees and in the number of refugees who live in protracted 
displacement. Simultaneously, there has been a general decline 
in the support for durable solutions, as a result of the mounting 
hostility towards foreigners in many countries, the reduction 
in international aid and a challenging climate for multilateral 
cooperation (Milner, 2014). In consequence, major host coun-
tries express a sense of being left on their own in managing the 
challenge. Traditional solutions are implemented in new ways, 
some of which have been heavily criticised by refugee scholars 
and others for undermining international law. The return to 
countries with ongoing conflicts, be it to ‘safe zones’ under 
international protection or to areas other than refugees’ area 
of origin (in effect, returning to become IDPs) exemplify this 
criticism (Weima & Hyndman, 2019).
3 In TRAFIG, we use the term solutions (to displacement) to refer to the capabil-
ities of displaced persons of rebuilding their lives after displacement and the 
opportunities available for doing so. We generally use “durable solutions” as a 
reference to the three conventional solutions: return and reintegration, local 
integration, and resettlement (or, in the context of internal displacement, 
settlement in another part of the country). When assessing whether a solution 
has been achieved, we will use the criteria developed in the IASC framework 
on durable solutions for IDPs. In recognising displaced people’s translocal 
connectivity, one must bear in mind that there might not be one “durable 
solution” for all members of a group, but rather multiple solutions that have 
to be seen in relation to one another (Etzold et al., 2019, p. 15).
parties to incorporate the Guiding Principles and, in a further 
step, the African Union adopted in 2009 the first treaty on 
internal displacement, the AU Convention for the Protection 
and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 
(Kampala Convention) (Kälin, 2014).
Fifth, further to the above-mentioned gaps and developments 
in addressing displacement from a governance perspective 
at the global level, specialised instruments were developed 
for children (1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child), 
stateless persons (1954 Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction 
of Statelessness), victims of trafficking, migrant workers (1990 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families) and 
others. All these instruments add governance structures and 
standards, but also governance actors that are active in their 
respective fields. Importantly, mandate, advocacy and respon-
sibilities of the respective institutions often are but one of the 
challenges in finding more global arrangements for displace-
ment.
Recent policy trends and protection challenges
The New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants was 
adopted in September 2016 and established the separate pro-
cesses to create the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration (Migration Compact) and the Global 
Compact on Refugees (Refugee Compact). The New York 
Declaration reiterates commitments to the human rights of 
refugees and migrants “regardless of status” on the basis of over 
30 references to human rights, as pointed out by Guild (2019). 
It also emphasises the centrality of the Refugee Convention and 
the importance of a humanitarian approach to migrants and 
refugees (Costello, 2018). States usually have specific policies 
towards refugees and asylum-seekers that limit their rights to 
employment, access to social services, housing, and education 
(Bloch & Schuster, 2002). 
The Refugee Compact outlines the reception, living condi-
tions and rights of asylum-seekers and refugees as areas in 
need of support. Nevertheless, several authors suggest that 
there are some important loopholes and gaps in the Compacts 
and the Declaration, which could pose risks to these human 
rights commitments. Costello (2018), for instance, points out 
that the Compacts and the Declaration lack a reference to any 
complementary and subsidiary protection or other practices of 
temporary refuge, and they do not reflect the ‘breadth’ of the 
notion of ‘refugee’ under UNHCR’s mandate, especially when 
it comes to refugees in states that have not ratified the Refugee 
Convention but offer some forms of group-based protection. 
Moreover, the Refugee Compact has been criticised for leaving 
major gaps, such as the lack of a global responsibility-sharing 
framework and the need to protect forced migrants who do not 
TRAFIG working paper no.3  •  01/2020  •  8
Still, across all study regions in the TRAFIG project, regional 
frameworks governing (protracted) displacement are either non-
binding instruments or, even if binding, lack enforcement capacity. 
Regional programmes seem to be still nascent or remain a compi-
lation of country-level programmes. 
Limited research has been done on regionalism as related 
to migration, as well as the potential for inter-regionalism or 
region-to-region engagement on these issues (Mathew & Harley, 
2016). However, Lavenex and Piper (2019) have argued that re-
gional approaches and the use of regional spaces in migration gov-
ernance can be seen as a reflection of either top-down or bottom-up 
governance: of purposeful interaction of states on migration issues 
in a formal institutional setting or non-state actors’ activities and 
norm-setting on migration in partnership with states. Depending 
on the power of state and non-state actors across different regions, 
the role of state- or civil society-led regional governance structures 
also varies. In the latter case, however, these have related more 
closely to advocacy on behalf of migrant workers (e.g. the Migrant 
Forum in Asia and the Global Coalition on Migration, which were 
active in contributing to the Migration Compact on behalf of civil 
society), rather than on protracted displacement or other refugee 
issues.
Moreover, Mathew and Harley (2016) outline the main advan-
tages and disadvantages that regional initiatives have in terms of 
enhancing protection for refugees. In terms of advantages, regional 
frameworks may be better placed than universal ones, as displace-
ment is often regional, and thus actors within the region have a 
This introduction to the global governance regime on displace-
ment illustrated some of the gaps at the global governance level. 
Some have been addressed, some remained unsolved. The 
sections below illustrate how regional and national arrange-
ments implement global governance schemes and how some 
of the global governance gaps are addressed. Ultimately, they 
look into which gaps subsist, also at sub-global level, leading 
to protracted and unsolved displacement situations. Displaced 
people navigate within those frameworks, but very often also 
seek individual solutions.
1.2.	In	and	through	regions
Regional-level initiatives have addressed some of the limita-
tions mentioned above as well as protection gaps at the global 
level of governance of (protracted) displacement.
The 1969 Convention of the Organisation of African Unity 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa (OAU Convention) provided for a much broader refugee 
definition than the Refugee Convention, by including “every 
person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order (…) 
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence (…)”. In 
comparison, the European Union (EU) has arguably been a 
late-comer to global refugee policies, with the ambitious project 
to align laws and institutions culminating in the first generation 
of the CEAS instruments in the early 2000s (Perchinig, Rasche, 
& Schaur, 2017).
Map	2:	Geographical	scope	of	regional	protection	frameworks
© ICMPD, Marion Noack, Martin Wagner
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more direct (and joint) interest in addressing it; they may be better 
equipped (with knowledge) to cater to the needs of the displaced in 
the region; and consensus on refugee rights may be more feasible 
or even more effective or comprehensive at the regional level 
(Mathew & Harley, 2016). Yet, interests that contribute to engaging 
with refugees at the regional level may not be in the best interest 
of refugees (for instance in terms of containment of refugees or 
global/inter-regional power dynamics), and regional approaches 
could produce disparities in treatment between regions and under-
mine the pursuit of universal refugee rights protection (Mathew & 
Harley, 2016; Stein, 1997).
In the sections that follow, we will first focus on frameworks 
(including binding and non-binding instruments) developed by 
regional multilateral actors and on how these fill in the gaps that 
persist at the global level. At a second level, we also consider other 
programmes and approaches taken by international or multina-
tional actors (such as the World Bank), or global or multilateral 
institutions from outside the region (e.g. the EU, UNHCR and 
UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency), but tai-
lored to particular regions. Finally, multilateral (regional) consulta-
tive and cooperative processes related to forced displacement and 
efforts developed under their umbrella, are also included and may 
be considered to fill in protection gaps at the regional level.
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2.	Governing	displacement	in	Europe
2.1	Governing	protection
All EU member states are signatories to the Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol. Compared to other regions, a regional 
area of protection developed rather late in Europe and is closely 
connected with the development of the Schengen area guar-
anteeing freedom of movement of people within the Schengen 
zone since the 1980s, yet reserving this for EU citizens only. 
Applicants for and beneficiaries of international protection are 
not included. Since then, the EU institutions have developed a 
relatively sophisticated asylum system. 
The Common European Asylum System has developed since 
1999, basically along four multi-year programmes (Wagner, 
Baumgartner, & Mouzourakis, 2019). Following the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the EU asylum directives underwent a recast pro-
cess that led to the current set of EU instruments: Directives 
2013/33/EU (Reception Directive), 2013/32/EU (Procedures 
Directive), 2011/95/EU (Qualification Directive). The Tem-
porary Protection Directive remained unaffected, and a new 
instrument was introduced to deal with the return of illegally 
staying third-country nationals (the 2008/115/EC Returns 
Directive). This recast process introduced substantial changes 
but failed to introduce an equal level of protection across the 
EU (De Baere, 2013; Ippolito & Velluti, 2011; Velluti, 2014; 
Zalar, 2013). This may be seen in a positive light to the extent 
that it allows member states to adopt standards more favourable 
to asylum claimants. Yet, it may also be seen as negative from 
the perspective of legal efficiency and avoidance of ‘forum 
shopping’—even if there is no evidence that this occurs to any 
significant extent.
In 2016, the European Commission put forward a series of leg-
islative drafts pertaining to all elements of the CEAS, which are 
currently being negotiated by the EU law-making institutions, 
specifically the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. 
While the proposal for reform of the Reception Directive also 
consists of a Directive, the proposals for reform of the Qualifi-
cation and Procedures Directives take the shape of Regulations, 
which translates into much less flexibility for EU member 
states in implementing EU standards and very limited scope 
to set higher standards (Craig & de Búrca, 2015, pp. 106–9).4  
Although this harmonisation effort may be seen positively for 
discouraging secondary movements of asylum-seekers across 
the EU, it also entails a serious risk of lowering the current 
standards (Peers, 2017).
4 Nonetheless, EU member states will still be able to introduce or retain a 
humanitarian protection status, in addition to the EU refugee and subsidiary 
protection statuses (Article 3 (2) Proposed Qualification Regulation).
While the term ‘protracted displacement’ in the context of 
international protection is not used in the CEAS, much of its 
development is closely linked with it. In fact, the central reason 
for the development of the ‘cornerstone of the CEAS’, namely 
the Dublin system, was developed to prevent asylum-seekers 
from being shuffled between states (‘refugees in orbit’) by ap-
plying clear criteria for the determination of responsibility of an 
EU member state (Van Oort, Battjes, & Brouwer, 2018,  
p. 14). While the CEAS closed several protection gaps (foremost 
by introducing subsidiary protection within the EU protection 
system), some remained, particularly with regard to a lack of 
access to protection, partly long-lasting asylum procedures, 
very diverse standards of reception, non-EU-harmonised 
humanitarian protection with very limited rights, different rec-
ognition rates among EU member states, and tight restrictions 
to freedom of movement. Not every protection status provides 
a tangible solution for the people concerned, leaving some in 
precarious situations.
Refugee protection, subsidiary protection and 
humanitarian protection in the EU 
The current CEAS instruments establish a two-tier system, 
whereby international protection beneficiaries may either be 
granted refugee status under the Refugee Convention or sub-
sidiary protection under EU legislation. Member states can also 
offer humanitarian protection, other sorts of ‘leave to remain’ 
or resident permits dependent on domestic norms. Where the 
requirements for granting refugee status are not met, domestic 
authorities can instead grant subsidiary protection, a legal 
status defined in Article 2 Qualification Directive as a form of 
protection for a 
third-country national or a stateless person who does not 
qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or 
in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of 
former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suf-
fering serious harm (…) and is unable, or, owing to such 
risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection 
of that country (European Union,2011).
Despite offering some form of international protection to claim-
ants, subsidiary protection falls short of full refugee status, 
generally translating into a restricted scope of rights, including 
fewer social benefits, less access to health care, less opportunity 
for family reunification, and, crucially, shorter residence rights 
(Guild, 2012, pp. 17–18). Furthermore, there is a marked lack 
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EU policies and strategies addressing protracted 
displacement
EU law policies and programmes explicitly related to protracted 
displacement have been developed from the perspective of 
development and humanitarian aid, both within and outside the 
so-called ‘external dimension’ of the EU’s migration and asylum 
policy. Some frameworks have been designed to specifically 
address situations of protracted displacement, others have con-
tributed indirectly to creating them. Key policy developments 
in the EU and the international protection regime are summa-
rised in Figure 1. We will discuss the most relevant of the policy 
milestones presented here from the perspective of protracted 
displacement. 
 In 2004, the European Commission (2004) issued a communi-
cation on improving access to durable solutions. While it em-
phasises the preference for return as the “most desirable durable 
solution”, it acknowledges that the EU should also facilitate 
resettlement and local integration, besides addressing the root 
causes (European Commission, 2004, p. 4). In that regard, the 
Commission highlights the objective of UNHCR to implement 
comprehensive plans of action to better support countries with 
large-scale refugee situations, promote the ‘self-reliance’ and 
local integration of refugees and returnees—also to reduce the 
need for onward migration—and agree on roles and responsi-
bilities of countries of origin, transit and destination while ac-
knowledging humanitarian assistance as insufficient to address 
protracted refugee situations in particular.
The 2015 European Agenda on Migration, developed and 
announced during the 2015-2016 ‘refugee crisis’, intended to 
address immediate challenges and equip the EU with the tools 
to better manage migration in the medium and long term in 
the areas of irregular migration, borders, asylum and legal 
migration. Crucially, this Agenda also introduced the “hotspot 
approach”, aimed to “swiftly identify, register and fingerprint 
incoming migrants” in key areas of arrival (European Commis-
sion, 2015b; European Parliament, 2016). This marked a turning 
point by allowing for the normalisation and generalisation of 
encampment in Europe, which is of particular relevance for 
protractedness (Kreichauf, 2018; Martin, Minca, & Katz, 2019; 
Sigona, 2015).
Also in 2015, the EU–Africa Summit on Migration was held 
in Valletta, Malta, which resulted in the Valletta Summit 
Action Plan (European Council, 2015). Out of the five priority 
domains, the first is called “Development benefits of migration 
and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced 
displacement”. The third domain “Protection and Asylum” 
re-emphasises the need to support the integration of long 
term-refugees and displaced persons in host communities and 
to strengthen capacities of countries of first asylum, transit and 
destination. 
of consistency in terms of asylum decision-making across the 
EU, which leads to a sort of “asylum lottery” whereby claimants 
can seemingly randomly be granted refugee status, subsidiary 
protection, humanitarian protection or no protection at all 
(AIDA & ECRE, 2017, p. 6). This “two-tier protection regime” 
has been criticised for having a “direct and far-reaching impact 
on the lives of beneficiaries of international protection”, leading 
to calls on the EU to fully align refugee status and subsidiary 
protection under EU law for the sake of legal and administrative 
efficiency and asylum claimants’ easier integration (AIDA & 
ECRE, 2017). 
Still, despite being criticised, subsidiary protection did close 
one significant protection gap that existed before the adoption 
of the Qualification Directive. Before the notion of subsidiary 
protection was introduced broadly at EU level, many people 
were forced into a limbo-like situation of protractedness: They 
were deprived of the status of refugees but could not return as 
they would have faced inhuman or degrading treatment in their 
country of origin (Kraler, 2009; Rosenberger, Ataç, & Schütze, 
2018). 
Most EU member states also complement international protec-
tion standards with further national protection statuses. Such 
statuses include humanitarian considerations (for example age 
or health considerations) and practical impediments to return 
(for instance lack of identity or non-acceptance of the country 
of return). Humanitarian protection, being a status deter-
mined at domestic level, falls outside the remit of EU compe-
tence. It is, however, generally used by EU member states as a 
‘residual’ form of protection when a person does not fulfil the 
criteria for refugee status or subsidiarity protection. Human-
itarian protection is mainly suitable for those claimants who 
cannot be deported. It generally entails less comprehensive 
protection than refugee status or subsidiary protection, and it 
ceases once the situation of danger leading to the protection 
comes to an end.
Refugee status, subsidiary protection status and humanitarian 
national protection statuses all have in common that the re-
ceiving state assumes responsibility for those in need of protec-
tion and that the people avail themselves of the protection of the 
receiving state. However, there still remains an unspecified  
number of people who fall outside this framework, for example, 
because the receiving country neither provides any protection 
status nor is able to return the person concerned. It may also 
happen that such persons do not wish to avail themselves of 
the protection of that particular member state and move on to 
another country in the EU, or they never availed themselves of 
the protection of any member state and continued to move and 
live ‘under the radar’. Members of this latter group are the most 
deprived of any form of protection or access to minimum rights, 
thus potentially more vulnerable to exploitation.
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situations by fostering self-reliance and enabling the displaced 
to live in dignity as contributors to their host societies, until 
voluntary return or resettlement” (Council of the EU, 2016; Eu-
ropean Commission, 2016). The Council Conclusions underline 
the need to work towards sustainable global and local solutions 
for displaced persons by addressing root causes, and to tackle 
the protracted nature of forced displacement. Generally, the 
policy framework calls for a stronger and strategic operational 
link between development and humanitarian approaches 
(thereby linking strategies and actions of respective Directo-
rates, for example, DEVCO, NEAR, ECHO and EEAs), based 
on broad partnerships and supported by political dialogue and 
diplomacy. The preparation of the policy framework fed into 
the Commission’s preparations of and participation at the World 
Humanitarian Summit in May 2016. Importantly, this policy 
framework was also the basis of the EU’s engagement in the 
elaboration of the Refugee Compact (Zamfir, 2019). Moreover, 
it has been the base of the Commission’s engagement in several 
initiatives that address protracted displacement, such as the 
roll-out of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in 
the Horn of Africa, the implementation of the so-called Jordan 
and Lebanon Compact promoting labour market and educa-
tional inclusion or the Humanitarian Emergency Social Safety 
Net in Turkey funded under the EU Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey. 
The EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan of October 2015 included 
a commitment by the Turkish government to reduce migration 
flows along the eastern Mediterranean route. In exchange, the 
EU pledged to mobilise substantial new funds for Turkey to 
support refugees via a dedicated €3 billion fund. In March 2016, 
the cooperation was further advanced by the EU–Turkey state-
ment, which included further action points on readmission. In 
particular, it regulated the return to Turkey of all new irregular 
migrants and asylum-seekers whose applications had been 
considered unfounded or inadmissible and a controversial ‘one 
to one’ mechanism. This mechanism foresees that for every 
Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek Islands, an-
other Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU (European 
Council, 2016). The EU–Turkey agreement was followed by the 
2017 Joint Communication on the Central Mediterranean 
Route (European Commission, 2017b) and the Malta Decla-
ration, key outcome of the Malta Summit in February 2017, 
which endorsed the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) between Italy and the internationally recognised Libyan 
government and aimed at stemming migratory flows, particu-
larly from Libya to Italy. 
Since 2016, the EU has a dedicated policy framework on forced 
displacement in place which intends to “prevent forced dis-
placement from becoming protracted and to gradually end de-
pendence on humanitarian assistance in existing displacement 
Figure	1:	Milestones	of	the	governance	of	displacement
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The EU deploys several instruments that strive to contribute to 
solving protracted displacement.Regional Protection Pro-
grammes (RPPs) have evolved as the main instrument to put 
the EU’s development-humanitarian assistance approach into 
practice. As described above, regional protection approaches 
emerged in 2003 in several Communications of the Commis-
sion and have been enshrined in the Hague Programme. Their 
main aim is to address protracted refugee situations by en-
hancing the capacity of countries in regions of origin or transit, 
and particularly in terms of protection and asylum regimes. 
These regional approaches to protection are referred to as an 
element of burden- and responsibility sharing with countries of 
origin and designed “to become a true alternative to protection 
in the EU” (European Commission, 2003, p. 17).
To be able to respond to protracted displacement and allocate 
funding, the Commission regularly establishes an annual list of 
‘forgotten crises’ based on the INFORM vulnerability index, 
media coverage, public aid per capita and a qualitative assess-
ment by DG ECHO experts. DG ECHO has a target of allo-
cating 15 per cent of its funding to forgotten crises each year 
and invites member states to coordinate funding and response 
to such crises (European Commission, DG ECHO, 2019a). The 
list includes protracted refugee situations, such as in Burundi 
or Afghan refugees in Pakistan (European Commission, DG 
ECHO, 2019b).
Preceding these efforts, the EU has issued several policy 
documents and strategic frameworks to bridge humanitarian 
assistance and development efforts (Hendow, 2019). The 
Commission’s 2012 Communication on its approach to resil-
ience emphasised the need to address chronic vulnerability by 
embedding humanitarian responses in broader development 
frameworks and approaches (European Commission, 2012), 
which was advanced in the Strategic Approach to Resilience in 
the EU’s external action (European Commission, 2017a). The 
Communication overall emphasises the need to address pro-
tracted displacement and protracted crisis by enhancing close 
cooperation of EU political, humanitarian and development 
actors.
The 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign 
and Security Policy aims to improve the resilience of con-
flict-affected states and societies, implement a more integrated 
approach to conflicts and crises and post-crisis reconstruction 
and prevent displacement by addressing its root causes (Euro-
pean Union, 2016a). The European Consensus on Development, 
released the same year, aligns the EU’s development policy 
with the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals 
and cites the importance of improving the resilience of persons 
in protracted displacement and their host communities and 
integrating the former into wider development planning besides 
addressing the root causes of displacement.
The 2016 Communication of the European Commission “Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance” focuses 
explicitly on situations of protracted forced displacement in third countries due to conflict, violence and human rights 
violations. It is based on a needs-based approach that relates vulnerabilities more to individual circumstances than to 
belonging to a defined category or group by underlining that “vulnerabilities should prevail over legal status” (Euro-
pean Commission, 2016, p. 4).
Elements of the policy framework are a stronger humanitarian–development nexus, early involvement of all actors, 
designing coherent strategies based on evidence, turning coherent strategies into coherent programming and fostering 
regional cooperation. Besides strategic cooperation with a wide range of actors, the framework aims to make the re-
sponse by the EU and its member states more coherent. To support EU agencies and member states in this process, it has 
developed six guidance notes covering the six areas below.
Box	1:	EU	policy	framework	on	forced	displacement	and	development
© ICMPD, Marion Noack, Martin Wagner
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a decision. This right to remain, however, does not constitute 
an entitlement to a residence permit (Article 9 Procedures 
Directive). The right to remain for international protection 
applicants directly derives from the non-refoulement principle; 
in principle, it extends to the whole asylum procedure until a 
legally binding decision has been issued. However, member 
states can resort to an array of exceptions, such as in the context 
of repeated applications or in the framework of admissibility 
procedures. The latter assesses, before the asylum procedure 
itself begins, whether another country is responsible (Dublin 
procedure within the EU; ‘safe country’ of asylum under  
Article 35 procedures Directive, and ‘safe third country’ of 
asylum under Article 38 Procedures Directive), in the context  
of third country involvement.
The rights of international protection applicants 
and beneficiaries
International protection applicants and beneficiaries of inter-
national protection in the EU enjoy a range of rights that vary 
depending on their status:
International protection applicants’ right of access to the 
labour market remains in place even during appeals against 
negative decisions. Although nearly all member states grant 
applicants access to the labour market during the asylum pro-
cedure, the waiting time until access is granted varies between 
member states, ranging from immediate access to access after 
nine months only. In fact, most countries grant access to the la-
bour market after six months. Such access to the labour market 
is, in any case, illusory in some member states, such as the 
United Kingdom (UK), where applicants often earn less than 
the minimum wage and are even found in exploitative labour 
relations (Lewis, Dwyer, Hodkinson, & Waite, 2013). 
To sum up, the EU role in tackling forced displacement has 
been evolving considerably in recent years. As the literature 
on the externalisation of EU migration and asylum policies 
suggests (Liguori, 2019; Menz, 2015; Pijnenburg, Gammeltoft- 
Hansen, & Rijken, 2018), this role is neither clear cut in terms of 
advancing particular norms and values nor coherent in terms of 
its overall objectives. Furthermore, the current debates on off-
shoring responsibility for providing protection also highlight 
major contestations of the direction EU policies have taken and 
the EU’s role in itself, also internationally. In the end, one is left 
with the impression that the EU’s policy reactions to the 2015-
2016 ‘refugee crisis’ were too short-sighted and underfinanced 
and had no real effect on improving the situation for refugees.
2.2		Exercising	rights	and	accessing	services
Broadly about half of the applications for international protec-
tion in the EU are rejected by first instance national asylum au-
thorities. The positive decisions are split between refugee status 
(which is commonly the most significant number of protection 
status granted), subsidiary protection (which is granted less 
often), and humanitarian protection (the status granted least). 
However, the data does not encompass all residence permits 
granted by member states on humanitarian grounds, as many 
of them are granted outside the protection regime, through a 
separate legal application channel.
The characteristics and duration of the asylum procedure(s) in 
the EU are instrumental in the protracted nature of displace-
ment in this region. In the first instance, the asylum procedure 
may last six months, which may be extended by a further nine 
months (Article 31(3) Procedures Directive). The Procedures 
Directive does not provide any time limitation on the asylum 
procedure at the appeal stage and allows applicants to remain 
in the member state until the determining authority has made 
Figure	2:	First	instance	decisions	on	claims	for	international	protection	in	the	EU28	(2008–2018)	
Source: Eurostat, retrieved on 29 September 2019 © ICMPD, Marion Noack, Martin Wagner
TRAFIG working paper no.3  •  01/2020  •  15TRAFIG working paper no.3  •  01/2020  •  14
Individuals who have been granted subsidiary protection have 
the right to reside in the host country. This is documented by 
a renewable residence permit valid for at least one year and, 
in case of renewal, for at least two years unless compelling 
reasons of national security or public order require otherwise 
(Article 24(2) Qualification Directive). The residence permit for 
these international protection beneficiaries can thus be shorter 
than that of recognised refugees, and “21 out of 28 EU Member 
States have followed a two-tier approach with regard to resi-
dence permits and grant less security of residence to persons 
benefitting subsidiary protection” (AIDA & ECRE, 2017, p. 15). 
In all countries, the first residence can be extended.
Similarly to recognised refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection are entitled to travel documents issued by the host 
country, but only when they are unable to obtain a passport 
from the country of origin’s authorities (Article 25 Qualifica-
tion Directive). This puts them at a disadvantage compared to 
recognised refugees (AIDA & ECRE, 2017, p. 16).
Although beneficiaries of subsidiary protection have access to 
the labour market, some EU member states have introduced 
measures that effectively discriminate against them by im-
posing additional requirements in comparison to recognised 
refugees (AIDA & ECRE, 2017, p. 22). Beyond this scope of 
rights, the exact content of subsidiary protection varies from 
country to country. 
The right to health is even more elusive: There are significant 
variations across the EU—some countries are considerably 
more restrictive in the range of healthcare services they offer 
to asylum seekers than other countries are, and variations can 
be observed even within the same country, such as in Germany 
(ECRE, AIDA & Asyl und Migration, 2019, pp. 85–86). 
Although the Reception Directive states that applicants should 
only be detained under exceptional circumstances and that this 
should take place along the principle of necessity and pro-
portionality (Recitals 15 ff and Articles 8-11), the UK detains 
migrants and asylum seekers under certain circumstances and 
currently stands out as the only EU member state that detains 
migrants indefinitely.
Rights granted to refugees reflect the Refugee Convention 
provisions and take into account the specific needs of ‘vulner-
able persons’ (Article 20 Qualification Directive). Besides the 
obvious protection from refoulement (Article 21 Qualification 
Directive), member states shall issue beneficiaries of refugee 
status a residence permit which must be valid for at least three 
years (Article 24 Qualification Directive). EU member states 
issue such residence permits for three years (ten countries), 
four years (one country), five years (eight countries), ten years 
(two countries) and permanent duration (six countries) (ECRE, 
2016). Shorter durations of residence permits obviously harm 
the social integration of refugees. 
Table	1:	International	protection	rights	entitlement	in	Europe	
International	protection	
applicants
Refugee	status Subsidiary	protection
Rights to information and documentation 
(Articles 5 and 6 RD, Article 22 QD)
Access to procedures, legal and procedural information,  
legal assistance and representation (Articles 6 ff PD)
X X
Right to housing or accommodation (Article 17 RD;  
Article 32 QD)
X X
(but on the same basis 
as other legally resident 
third-country nationals)
X
(but on the same basis 
as other legally resident 
third-country nationals)
Special reception conditions for vulnerable claimants 
(Articles 21 ff RD)
X
Right to the education of minors (Article 14 RD; Article 26 QD) X X X
Access to the labour market (Article 15 RD; Article 26 QD) X
(within nine monts of 
application)
X X
Access to vocational training (Article 16 RD; Article 26 QD) member state discrection X
Access to healthcare (Article 19 AD; Article 30 QD) only emergency care and 
essential treatment of illnesses 
and serious mental disorders
X X
Social assistance (Article 29 QD) - X X
(but may be limited to 
core benefits
Note: RD= Reception Directive; QD=Qualification Directive
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in terms of the minimum period of residence required, and 2) 
the fact that a majority of countries require longer minimum 
periods of residence from beneficiaries of subsidiary protection 
than of recognised refugees (AIDA & ECRE, 2017, pp. 20–21). 
The right to vote is another significant aspect of social and 
political integration that is not regulated at EU level but at the 
domestic level. There are obvious variations across the EU, yet 
even recognised refugees are most often excluded from exer-
cising their right to vote (Ziegler, 2017).
Temporarily suspended deportation or tolerated stay (Dul-
dung) is granted to persons who are not entitled to asylum, a 
refugee status or subsidiary protection in Germany, but who 
cannot return to their country of origin owing to concrete 
dangers to life or liberty that exist in that country (in ac-
cordance with §60 and §60a Residence Act, AufenthG) (see 
Beinhorn, Gasch, Glorius, Kintz, & Schneider, 2019 for an 
overview report on the governance of the asylum reception 
system in Germany). At the end of 2018, around 180,000 
persons lived in Germany with a ‘Duldung’ (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2019a, p. 51). On this basis, they are granted a 
temporary residence permit for at least one year. Repeated 
extensions are possible. In contrast to recognised refugees, 
barriers block ‘tolerated’ persons’ access to work. Employ-
ment is possible, but permission must be obtained from the 
immigration office, which undertakes a priority check, an 
instrument that has not been fully abolished despite legal 
changes in 2016 under the so-called Integration Law. Due to 
the priority checks, Germans, EU citizens and refugees with 
a more secure legal status continue to be privileged in their 
access to work, in particular over “tolerated” persons from 
“safe countries of origin” (Etzold, 2017). 
Rejected asylum-seekers are ordered to leave Germany 
voluntarily within thirty days after the respective decision. If 
they do not return voluntarily, local immigration authorities 
have the responsibility to deport them to their country of or-
igin or a ‘safe third country’. The local authorities can also 
temporarily suspend their return and grant further time-lim-
ited residence permits. Legal and practical difficulties of 
carrying out deportations explain why 405,000 people had 
their claims rejected more than six years ago, but continue 
to live in Germany. Despite being rejected once, 40 per cent 
of them now have an open-ended residence permit, while 38 
per cent have a temporary residence permit and 22 per cent 
are constantly ‘living in limbo’ with a ‘Duldung’ or no legal 
status at all. Rejected asylum-seekers are not entitled to 
take part in integration classes, language courses and other 
employment enhancing instruments. They are also prevented 
from entering Germany’s labour market—at least formally 
(Etzold, 2017). 
Box	2:	Exercising	rights	and	accessing	services	in	Germany:	
Tolerated	stays
Box	3:	Exercising	rights	and	accessing	services	in	Italy:	
The	labour	market
The year 2018 marked a crucial turn in the Italian legal and 
policy framework on asylum. Law Decree 113/2018 (the so-
called Decreto Salvini, named after the former Italian Min-
ister of the Interior Matteo Salvini, leader of the far-right 
League party), implemented by Law 132/2018, has signifi-
cantly reformed the Italian asylum system, with a potential 
impact on protracted displacement in Italy. The changes 
introduced by the Salvini Decree have had a direct impact 
on the daily lives of asylum-seekers in Italy—increasing 
the risk for the most vulnerable of falling into marginality, 
precarity and irregularity—but also on the already highly 
politicised public debate on migration and asylum, feeding a 
widespread anti-migrant sentiment.
Participation in informal labour markets is widespread 
among asylum-seekers and international protection bene-
ficiaries. This is particularly true for seasonal work in the 
agricultural sector, for which serious incidences of labour 
exploitation have been reported all over Italy (Caritas Ital-
iana, 2018; MEDU, 2015). This phenomenon is particularly 
worrying because it is intertwined with the criminal activi-
ties of organised crime groups, both in the north and in the 
south of Italy (so-called caporalato—gangmaster system), 
and it is usually associated with violence, inadequate 
working and living conditions, and sometimes even depri-
vation of liberty. Informal work in the agricultural sector 
is often associated with informal accommodation in remote 
areas and makeshift camps with no electricity, heating and 
water. In such contexts of extremely risky and precarious 
hygienic and living conditions, migrants frequently suffer 
from serious health problems and injuries or even die (for 
instance as a result of accidental fires, car accidents, etc.). 
In July 2019, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies 
agreed with the Ministry of Agricultural Policies, the Min-
istry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior on estab-
lishing an Inter-ministerial Operative Roundtable tasked 
to define a new strategy to counter ‘caporalato’ and labour 
exploitation in the agricultural sector (Decree 4 July 2019). 
This might prove to be a positive institutional development 
in the fight against labour exploitation.  
Even though the matter of acquiring the nationality of the 
receiving country is not regulated at EU level due to lack of 
competence on this matter, it is worth mentioning, as it plays a 
crucial role in social integration and protracted displacement. 
As CEAS instruments do not cover this, it is up to each member 
state to set the stakes for international protection beneficiaries 
to acquire the nationality of the host country. A comparison of 
these requirements points to: 1) a wide variation across the EU 
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for those subject to a Dublin procedure. Both the differentiation 
of rights and issues around secondary movements contribute to 
some extent to protracted displacement.
At the national level in Europe, legislation is often designed and 
implemented partly in response to international-level processes, 
partly in response to EU-wide legal and policy developments, 
and partly in response to the changing numbers of migrants and 
asylum-seekers arriving in each country. During periods when 
arrivals of migrants and asylum-seekers are high, legislation 
is designed with the express intent of reducing asylum appli-
cations as well as those who live in situations of protracted 
displacement. We see this in the context of Greece, where, to 
achieve this objective, returns have been encouraged, deten-
tion capacities increased and asylum procedures accelerated. 
Changes in legislation further reflect the politicised nature of 
legislation and the influence of the media and public opinion. 
Further, implementation of legislation in local regions, mu-
nicipalities and questure (local police headquarters) may be 
competing and contradictory, as is the case in less centralised 
states such as Germany and Italy. In short, protection legisla-
tion can be characterised by a lack of coherence, ambiguity and 
inconsistency. Crucially, long periods of waiting for asylum 
decisions contribute to protracted displacement. 
Protracted displacement in the EU's external  
policies
From an external perspective, the EU’s policy framework on 
forced displacement aims specifically to prevent the creation of 
situations where displaced populations are ‘in limbo’ by linking 
development and humanitarian assistance and facilitating the 
move from situations of “care and maintenance” to self-reliance 
(European Commission, 2016, p. 4). According to the EU, host 
country policies that restrict access to labour markets, limit 
mobility, long-term legal status and require continuous support 
from humanitarian actors result in situations of ‘limbo’. 
The EU supports projects that promote legal registration for dis-
placed populations, including registering births to prevent the 
emergence of new stateless populations, as mentioned, among 
others in the EU-Africa Joint Valletta Action Plan. The EU 
also supports the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
and systematically promotes the inclusion of these principles 
in international and national law. Furthermore, the Regional 
Protection Programmes and the Regional Development Pro-
tection Programmes all strengthen the capacities of national 
authorities in refugee status determination. The programmes 
also intend to enhance access to durable solutions although 
their direct impact on this is difficult to assess. The EU is also 
funding the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS), a 
platform of 14 NGOs that acts as a catalyst and agent provoca-
teur to stimulate forward-thinking and policy development on 
durable solutions for displacement (Regional Durable Solutions 
Secretariat, 2019).
Broader issues of refugees’ and beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection’s social integration are left largely to the discretion 
of member states in the context of their own social integration 
programmes (Article 34 Qualification Directive). The legal status 
of beneficiaries of humanitarian protection and refused interna-
tional protection applicants is also left to member states’ discre-
tion, which has the potential to foster protracted displacement. 
In sum, there is a clear differentiation of statuses in the EU; 
these are related to a differentiation of rights which in turn means 
that durable solutions are only available, at least theoretically, 
for those on the upper end of the status hierarchy, in a sort 
of “civic stratification” (Morris, 2002). Second, the scale of 
secondary movements suggests that there is a marked mismatch 
between international protection applicants’ views on where 
they can find a durable solution and the principle that interna-
tional protection applicants should find protection in the first 
EU country. This mismatch may also translate into uncertainty 
Box	4:	Exercising	rights	and	accessing	services	in	Greece:	
Housing
According to Article 18 of Law No. 4540/18, asylum-seekers’ 
housing comes in three alternatives: 1) accommodation fa-
cilities in border regions, 2) open accommodation facilities 
managed by public or private non-profit entities or inter-
national organisations, 3) apartments, buildings or hotels 
rented through housing programmes for asylum-seekers. 
Accommodation in border regions primarily refers to recep-
tion and identification centres (RICs or ‘hotspots’), essen-
tially on the five eastern Aegean Islands. By 31 October 2019, 
about 35,787 persons lived on the islands (NCCBCIA, 2019). 
Almost half (17,010) were on Lesvos; over 32,000 lived in 
RICs, although their combined nominal capacity does not 
exceed 6,180. About half of the remaining 3,780 persons 
lived in apartments; another 1,314 at the ‘Kara Tepe’ open 
camp in Lesvos; the rest (including unaccompanied minors) 
live in various smaller state- or NGO-run facilities.
Living conditions in RICs are generally poor, ranging from 
highly problematic to ‘dire’ and ‘inhuman’. Having to live 
in containers or even tents, in a fenced, camp-like (or even 
semi-carceral) environment for months is in itself a challenging 
situation; severely overcrowded facilities, deteriorating 
sanitary conditions, lack of access to adequate health care, 
lack of security, etc., render RICs particularly harsh or even 
insufferable places to live in, especially for vulnerable groups 
(Gemi & Triandafyllidou, 2018, pp. 27–29; Greek Council for 
Refugees & ECRE, 2019, pp. 128–131; Kourachanis, 2018). 
With escalating numbers of newcomers during August to Oc-
tober 2019 (averaging over 9,000 sea arrivals per month), the 
already appalling conditions in RICs have severely worsened: 
indicatively, the occupancy rates of RICs on 31 October 2019 
were 959 per cent in Vathy-Samos, 520 per cent in Mo-
ria-Lesvos and 496 per cent in ViAl-Chios (NCCBCIA, 2019).
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Literature also refers to EU policies that create such situations 
of ‘limbo’ by pursuing restrictive visa policies, sanctions 
against passenger carriers and the use of the safe third country 
concept (Carrera & Cortinovis, 2019). The focus on “addressing 
the root causes of displacement and irregular migration”, that 
was prevalent already in the 1990s and recently re-emerged, is 
also viewed in the vein of “containment” rather than facilitating 
access to protection and solutions. Technical cooperation agree-
ments, such as the EU–¬Turkey statement, follow the objective 
of preventing unauthorised arrivals at the EU external border. 
Even though the Statement allows for some (highly selective) 
mobility, it has left people with fewer opportunities to search 
for solutions and in situations of ‘limbo’, as illustrated by the 
low number of returns to Turkey (Carrera & Cortinovis, 2019; 
UNHCR, 2019c). The €6 billion EU Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey complemented the EU-Turkey Statement. It includes the 
Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme, a multi-pur-
pose cash transfer scheme that provides monthly assistance 
through debit cards to over 1.5 million refugees in Turkey. With 
1,125 billion, it is the largest humanitarian aid programme ever 
funded by the EU (European Commission, 2019; World Food 
Programme, 2019).
2.3		Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	
displacement
Family reunification
Family reunification is an essential element in the mobility as-
pirations and connectivity of asylum-seekers and international 
protection beneficiaries. The right to family life, more broadly, 
and its significance in the process of settlement and inclusion 
in the host society, is recognised in international and European 
legislation (Kasli & Scholten, 2018, p. 3). In general, interna-
tional protection applicants in the EU do not enjoy a right to 
family reunification. However, the Dublin Regulation applies a 
set of hierarchical criteria that determine the responsibility of 
a member state for an application for international protection, 
and the first and highest criterion refers to family reunifica-
tion. The asylum authority thus has to review first whether the 
applicant has family members in a member state, in which case 
this member state may need to resume responsibility for the 
applicant. This is often cited as one of the biggest problems of 
the Dublin system, which too rarely applies the family unity 
criteria. Garlick (2016, p. 43) posits that the Dublin system 
should, in theory, put family reunification first before all other 
criteria. If it did so, this would address one of the main reasons 
why people move onwards within Europe.
Law No. 4375/2016 (Article 41) foresees geographical 
restriction of international protection claimants to “a 
certain part of the Greek territory” as a possibility and this 
was applied immediately after the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey Statement. It should be noted that although Law 
No. 4375/2016 (Article 60(2)) foresees that when a decision 
on the application is not taken within 28 days, the applicant 
shall be allowed to move to the mainland and have their 
application examined under the regular procedure, this is 
not applied. Based on a number of concerns with respect 
to the legality of indiscriminate geographical restriction, 
the Greek Council for Refugees brought the case before 
the Council of State, which annulled the Asylum Service 
decision in April 2018. However, this has not resulted in 
the termination of the geographical restriction, as a legal 
amendment and a new series of Asylum Service decisions 
have reframed in ‘safer’ legal terms the need and justifi-
cation for this restriction (Greek Council for Refugees & 
ECRE, 2019).
Family reunification for foreigners is generally regulated by 
the Greek PD 131/2006. Preconditions include two years of 
residence in Greece, as well as accommodation, a defined 
level of income and social insurance (Article 5). Provisions 
for recognised refugees are, nominally, more ‘generous’, 
according to Article 4 of PD 167/2008: There is no time 
requirement for applying for family reunification. However, 
in practice, family reunification for refugees is an extremely 
difficult and lengthy procedure. In 2018, out of 346 sub-
mitted applications for family reunification, only 25 received 
a positive or partially positive decision and 16 received a 
negative decision (Greek Council for Refugees & ECRE, 
2019, p. 182). Family members of a recognised refugee who 
are in Greece but do not fulfil the criteria for international 
protection, are entitled to a stay permit and other rights 
(travel documents, health care, education, etc.), in order to 
preserve ‘ family unity’ (Article 23 PD 141/2013; Article 21(2) 
Law No. 4375/2016). 
Family reunification under the provisions of the Dublin III 
Regulation is relevant to the question of mobility of asy-
lum-seekers, both with regard to the opportunity to move to 
another EU country and the obligation to return to Greece 
(typically undesirable for asylum-seekers). According to 
statistical data from the Dublin Unit of the Greek Asylum 
Service, Greece submitted about 25,975 requests to other 
member states between 2013 and September 2019, the ma-
jority of which (54 per cent) to Germany alone. 
Box	5:	Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	displace-
ment	in	Greece
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fulfil particular integration conditions in family reunification 
applications, which makes it particularly difficult for those with 
low incomes and levels of education (Conte, 2018, p. 9). 
Mobility within the EU and the member states
Mobility plays a crucial role for forced migrants in Europe. 
While it is difficult to measure, eu-LISA data shows that asylum 
applicants who had previously lodged an application in another 
EU member state, in particular, tended to move on in rather 
large numbers. In 2018, for instance, 236,098 international 
protection applicants moved from the country where they had 
initially applied to another member state. Compared to overall 
664,815 applications, a significant number thus sought another 
solution than the one offered to them by the CEAS.6 
International protection applicants are not free to move within 
the EU or the Schengen area. According to a set of rules, the 
Dublin System determines which EU member state is respon-
6 All data available through the eu-LISA website: https://eulisa.europa.eu/
EU legislation on the family reunification rights of third-
country nationals (Family Reunification Directive) allows 
refugees to be joined by family members.5  ‘Family members’ 
categorically include spouses and (unmarried and ‘underage’) 
children, but only include unmarried partners ‘in a duly 
attested stable long-term relationship’ and registered partners 
upon member states’ discretion (Articles 4 and 10). This frame-
work leaves non-heterosexual and trans international protection 
beneficiaries in a considerably disadvantaged position (Fer-
reira, 2018, pp. 40–41). The Family Reunification Directive 
only applies to 25 EU member states and is not binding the UK, 
Denmark and Ireland (Conte, 2018, p. 4). It does not permit an 
imposed waiting period for family reunification applications in 
the case of refugee status holders and gives special treatment to 
refugees who are not expected to meet the same conditions as 
third-country nationals. Chapter V of the Directive stipulates 
that refugees and their family members do not need to meet 
particular requirements (i.e. housing, income and integration 
conditions) if they apply for family reunification within three 
months of being awarded status (Article 12). If they fail to do 
so, they must fulfil the same ‘material requirements’ as other 
third-country nationals, including persons holding subsidiary 
protection (ECRE, AIDA & ASGI, 2017, p. 108).
While the Family Reunification Directive does not include 
beneficiaries of temporary protection or applicants for or 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, it does not exclude 
them either (Article 3(2)) (Peers, 2018). The phrasing in the 
Family Reunification Directive was not meant to exclude those 
who had gained subsidiary protection. Furthermore, the 2014 
European Commission’s guidance supports the protection of 
refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. Yet, this 
lack of clarity within the Directive has led to a detrimental 
interpretation concerning subsidiary protection beneficiaries. 
Following extensive migration to Europe in 2015, a raft of re-
strictive family reunification measures targeting those granted 
subsidiary protection were implemented throughout Europe 
(Mouzourakis, 2017, p. 16). 
Humanitarian status holders, like beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection, have to demonstrate that “they are facing spe-
cial hardship or the impossibility of family life in order to be 
accepted for family reunification” (Conte, 2018, p. 5). Human-
itarian status holders and subsidiary protection holders have to 
5 Articles 9 ff of the Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the 
right to family reunification, Official Journal L 251, 03/10/2003 P. 0012 – 0018. 
Importantly, the Family Reunification Directive only applies to family reunifi-
cation between third-country nationals. It does not apply to (former) refugees 
who have acquired the nationality of the state of residence and cannot claim 
EU freedom of movement rights. In relation to these, many EU member states 
seem to apply the same provisions as for third-country nationals, and often 
they enjoy a somewhat privileged position. However, this case of reunification 
is not regulated at the EU level (Kraler, 2014).
Between 2012 and 2017, the number of people arriving 
in Germany by family reunification doubled from 55,000 
to 115,000 (BAMF, 2019). This increase has been largely 
attributed to the displacement crises in the Middle East, 
as Syrian and Iraqi nationals applied for visas for family 
reunification with their spouse in Germany. The German 
Residence Act (§27-36) was amended multiple times between 
2005 and 2015, especially to take the EU Family Reunifi-
cation Directive into account. The 2015 amendment also 
allowed family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection (Grote, 2017, pp. 13–15). Shortly after, however, 
access to family reunification for family members of subsid-
iary protection beneficiaries was restricted again, as it was 
suspended for two years. Given the rapid increase of asylum 
applications between 2014 and 2016 and a parallel increase 
in family reunification, restrictions to the latter were seen 
as an effective lever to curb refugee movements to Germany. 
Since August 2018, subsidiary protection beneficiaries can 
apply for reunification with their family members again, 
however, an overall cap was introduced: No more than 
1,000 partners and children per month can receive a visa 
(BAMF, 2019, p. 123; Christ, Meininghaus, & Röing, 2019,  
p. 14). As more and more asylum applicants are only granted 
subsidiary protection, this restrictive rule has clearly 
contributed to the recent reduction of arrivals by family 
reunification in Germany. 
Box	6:	Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	displace-
ment	in	Germany
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another member state than the one that granted them interna-
tional protection after five years and may engage in economic 
activities, studies or other purposes there (2003/109/EC, 
Article 14(2)). As humanitarian protection statuses are national 
statuses, holders of humanitarian protection status enjoy more 
limited rights in respect to travel compared to beneficiaries of 
international protection.
Migration in the EU's external policies 
Programmes in the EU’s external dimension that affect the pos-
sibilities of connectivity and mobility of displaced people follow 
the dual objective of creating durable solutions and addressing 
the root causes of forced migration, but also preventing ‘irreg-
ular’ mobility into the EU. With regard to addressing the root 
causes, the EU explicitly states in its European Agenda on 
Migration that it “can also take immediate action to intervene 
upstream in regions of origin and of transit” to prevent displace-
ment from occurring in the first place (European Commission, 
2015a). In contrast, the Strategic Approach to Resilience in the 
EU's external action emphasises the potential of migration as an 
adaptation strategy: “Properly designed migration policies can 
strengthen economic resilience, both in the host countries and in 
the communities of origin. Moreover, at an individual level, mi-
gration and flight can be a legitimate adaptation strategy to severe 
external stresses” (European Commission, 2017a).
sible. This hierarchy of criteria encompasses, among others, the 
presence of family members of the applicant in a State (Article 
8-10), previous issuance of residence documents (Article 12) or 
the member state of entry or stay (Article 13). Once a members 
state has assumed responsibility, it remains responsible, and 
onward movement to another member state is not allowed until 
there is an outcome of the legal procedure.
Although EU countries have established asylum procedures 
that are based on common standards, there is no mutual recog-
nition of international protection statuses among EU countries 
(Wagner & Kraler, 2016, p. 94). The main implication is that 
they have to apply for admission under the general framework 
for legal migration should they want to move to another EU 
member state. In the European context, international protection 
beneficiaries who move from the country of asylum to another 
European country do not lose their protection status in the first 
country of asylum, as this would not correspond to one of the 
reasons listed in the Qualification Directive for the withdrawal 
of international protection status. However, they would not 
enjoy the rights associated with the international protection 
status in the country of asylum, and their legal status would 
depend on the status granted upon admission in that state. 
In most member states, beneficiaries of refugee status may 
move freely within that state’s territory. Some member states, 
however, also restrict free movement within their territory 
(ECRE, 2016, p. 22). For example, the German Integration 
Act introduced the ‘Wohnsitzauflage’ (residence regulations), 
which require refugees to live in a particular federal state, and 
even in a particular area for three years if they are not working 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2019b). With this regulation, the federal 
Government takes away the freedom of movement from refu-
gees and further increases their social isolation.
The status of subsidiary protection is not mutually recognised 
within EU member states either. Beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection may thus not exercise their rights in another member 
state, and the state which granted the subsidiary protection 
status remains responsible. The implications on the mobility 
of persons only enjoying subsidiary protection are likely to be 
slightly different from those recognised as refugees, as their 
status is temporary and systematically reviewed in the initial 
period of their stay. They thus face a higher risk of withdrawal 
of their status in the first country of asylum in the EU.
As legal residents of an EU member state, in principle, inter-
national protection beneficiaries are eligible for a long-term 
residence status after five years of residence and thus for 
associated freedom of movement rights. The 2011 amendment 
of the Long Term Residence Directive (2011/51/EU) extends 
the right to stay in another member state after five years also 
to beneficiaries of refugee status and subsidiary protection. 
International protection beneficiaries can, therefore, reside in 
Based on EU law, beneficiaries of international protection 
are free to travel to other EU countries but can stay for no 
more than three months. The residence permit issued by 
Italian authorities to international protection beneficiaries 
does not allow their holders to access the labour market 
of another EU country and move and reside there (Della 
Torre & de Lange, 2018). As mentioned above, international 
protection beneficiaries can only apply for a long-term 
residence permit and acquire intra-EU mobility rights after 
five years. However, based on empirical evidence, it is not 
uncommon for international protection beneficiaries in 
Italy not to wait for this five-year period to pass, to find an 
informal job in another EU country (e.g. Switzerland, Ger-
many, Norway, Sweden, Finland, etc.) and to settle there. 
However, since their residence permit is issued by Italian 
authorities, they have to periodically return to Italy in order 
to renew it. This is especially true for holders of a humani-
tarian protection permit, which has to be renewed every two 
years (Borri, 2016). These persons become stuck in a situa-
tion of “protracted forced mobility”, where mobility across 
EU countries is a constraint and a necessity (Wyss, 2019). 
Box	7:	Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	displace-
ment	in	Italy
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ECRE, 2019, p. 62). Subsequently, in 2018, the European Com-
mission decided to resettle up to 50,000 refugees from northern 
Africa to EU member states, and Germany participated in this 
resettlement programme by accommodating 10,000 people 
(Chemin, Hess, Nagel, Kasparek, Hänsel, & Jakubowski, 2018).
Humanitarian admission programmes
Humanitarian visas and, more generally, admission pro-
grammes, would allow people to flee for safety by travelling 
with valid documents. “Humanitarian corridors”, like those 
facilitated by the Community of Sant’Egidio, could facili-
tate this.7  Such humanitarian initiatives are not regulated at 
European level, and this type of visas is not generally issued by 
domestic authorities (Moreno-Lax, 2019), which makes peo-
ple’s journeys to Europe all the more perilous. The European 
Parliament supported the creation of a Protected Entry Proce-
dure with the aim of closing this gap in the effectiveness and 
fundamental rights protection in CEAS (European Parliament, 
2018a, 2018b). Private sponsorship has also played an increas-
ingly significant role in the reception of international protec-
tion claimants and refugees, having become an established 
alternative, for instance in Canada (Immigration, Refugees 
and Citizenship Canada, 2019). Despite its shortcomings and 
insufficient scope, this provides another pathway to the pro-
tection of displaced people who are embedded in transnational 
networks and has thus been suggested as a policy recommenda-
tion (Doyle & Macklin, 2017, p. 5; Kumin, 2015; MPI Europe & 
ICF, 2018).
7 https://www.santegidio.org/pageID/30112/langID/en/Humanitarian-Corri-
dors.html.
Resettlement and relocation
Resettlement is the most direct link to facilitating the creation 
of transnational networks. In 2005, resettlement became a 
component of the newly established Regional Protection Pro-
grammes (European Commission, 2005). Later on, the adoption 
of the European Refugee Fund in 2007 and the first EU joint 
resettlement action in 2008 represented two major incentives 
that stimulated EU member states’ involvement in refugee 
resettlement and paved the way towards later developments. In 
2018, resettlement had been embedded as a policy priority at the 
EU level following several stand-alone joint resettlement pro-
grammes, with EU funding available for member states hosting 
resettled refugees through the Asylum, Migration and Integra-
tion Fund (AMIF/ERF). The most significant example of this 
Europeanisation of resettlement came in 2016 with a legislative 
proposal made by the European Commission that sought to 
establish, for the first time, a Union Resettlement Framework 
(European Commission, 2018). It aims to create a more predict-
able framework for resettlement of third-country nationals into 
the EU with the creation of EU-wide two-year plans. 
The first joint EU Resettlement Programme started in 2008 and, 
in 2009, the Commission issued a Communication on the es-
tablishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Programme to establish 
a more impactful and strategically coordinated EU engage-
ment in resettlement. During mid-to-late 2017, the European 
Commission launched a new resettlement pledging exercise and 
called on EU member states to resettle at least 50,000 persons 
in need of international protection by October 2019. This was 
intended to address the gap between the end of the resettlement 
scheme under the 2015 Council Conclusions in mid-2017 and 
the expected adoption of the Union Resettlement Framework. 
Twenty EU member states pledged 50,030 places for resettle-
ment for this period. Finally, a dedicated Core Group focusing 
on resettlement and complementary pathways along the Central 
Mediterranean route, chaired by France, was set up.
The EU Relocation scheme introduced by the Council De-
cisions 2015/1523 (14 September 2015) and 2015/1601 (22 
September 2015) stated the goal to alleviate pressure from 
Greece and Italy. According to these decisions, relocation will 
be available to nationals of a country that has a (EU total) 
recognition rate of 75 per cent or higher. In fact, the majority of 
asylum-seekers to be relocated (a total of 66,400 individuals) 
were among those who had been stranded in Greece. Greece 
submitted 24,911 ‘take-charge’ requests, almost 80 per cent of 
which (19,584) referred to Syrian nationals. The vast majority of 
these requests (22,822 or 91.6 per cent) were accepted; 22,000 
individuals were actually relocated from Greece, 45 per cent of 
whom were minors (Greek Ombudsman, 2019, p. 31). A bilat-
eral agreement between Greece and Portugal was announced in 
October 2018, according to which 1,000 asylum-seekers were to 
be relocated to Portugal in 2019 (Greek Council for Refugees & 
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The 2009 African Union Kampala Convention (Convention 
for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Per-
sons in Africa) specifically addresses internal displacement on 
the continent. It sets out state responsibilities for the protection 
of and assistance to IDPs. The Convention builds on the Great 
Lakes Region Pact protocol on IDPs and is also legally binding. 
Similarly to the protocol, it also attributes a role to the interna-
tional community, civil society and the African Union in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 responding to the needs of IDPs (Kälin & Schrepfer, 2012). 
Article 8 empowers the African Union to intervene in cases of 
grave violations of IDP rights (war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity). The Convention has been argued to be a re-
sponse from African countries to the increasing international-
isation of internal displacement (including a view that interna-
tional actors have too much influence on this), aiming to regain 
some of that control (Abebe, 2010). Further, as it was developed 
based on an agreement among the relevant African states, it has 
been argued, to reflect a strong commitment of signatory states 
(Giustiniani, 2011).
There are also several multi-stakeholder regional initiatives 
worth mentioning. These include a Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework in Somalia (Global Compact on Refugees 
Platform, 2019); the 2017 Djibouti Declaration and the Action 
Plan on Refugee Education in Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) member states calling for the inte-
gration of refugees in national education policies and access to 
quality education for refugees, returnees and host communities 
(IGAD Ministers of Education, 2017); the Durable Solutions 
Initiative (DSI), which aims at promoting durable solutions 
in Somalia and the region and engages on the reintegration of 
refugees and IDPs; the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat, 
which brings together 14 NGOs across the East Africa and 
3.	Governing	displacement	in	East	
Africa	and	the	Horn	of	Africa
3.1.	Governing	protection
Across the African context, there are several regional frameworks 
and programmes of relevance. While these regional frameworks 
do provide an overarching framework, they are first and foremost 
implemented at the national level: Action plans and implementa-
tion of frameworks are usually translated into national projects or 
programmes. The key elements of the legal framework relating to 
forced displacement in the African countries within TRAFIG’s 
remit are as follows:
The 1969 OUA Convention Governing the Specific Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa has been signed and/or ratified 
by all countries within TRAFIG’s remit. All these countries 
have also signed the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 
Protocol.
The 2006 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR) Pact on Security, Stability and Development 
includes two legally binding protocols on IDPs and returnees. 
The first calls on its member states to provide protection and 
assistance to IDPs and to implement the UN’s Guiding Princi-
ples on Internal Displacement. While responding to the needs 
of IDPs is considered within the mandates of national gov-
ernments, should the government not have the capacity, the Pro-
tocol on IDPs states that “such Governments shall accept and 
respect the obligation of the organs of the international commu-
nity to provide protection and assistance to internally displaced 
persons” (Article 3.10). The second calls on its member states to 
adopt legal principles to ensure that returnees can recover their 
property and to create a legal framework for resolving disputes 
that may arise from that. Although, as a matter of course, actual 
implementation differs across the region, the legal framework 
has been established at the regional level, and there is a recogni-
tion of the role of international actors and local civil society in 
its implementation (Kälin & Schrepfer, 2012).
Table	2:	Legal	frameworks	in	African	countries
Country Party	to	1951	UN	Convention	
and	Protocol
Relevant	national	legislation Regional	legislation	/	policy Cooperation
Ethiopia Yes Yes, since 2004, revised in 2019 1969 OAU Convention 
2009 Kampala Convention on 
IDPs signed but not ratified
Registration by government
Tanzania Yes Yes, 1998 Refugee Act 1969 OAU Convention
2006 Great Lakes Pact
Registration by Department 
of Refugees
DR Congo Yes Yes, 2002 Refugee law 1969 OAU Convention
2006 Great Lakes Pact
2009 Kampala Convention on  
IDPs
Registration by National  
Refugee Commission, 
support mostly by UNHCR 
and other international 
organisations.
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Horn of Africa regions (ReDSS, 2019). The EU Trust Fund on 
Migration also invests in the Horn of Africa region through 
a variety of national programmes supporting the CRRF, as 
well as a Regional Development and Protection Programme 
(RDPP), led by the Netherlands, which also works with the ILO 
on a strategic partnership on “Inclusive Jobs and Education 
for forcibly displaced persons and host communities” in the 
Horn of Africa (Royal Netherlands Embassy in Uganda, 2019). 
Finally, the World Bank (2018, 2019a) has established a fund 
available for refugees and host communities for low-income 
host countries of large numbers of refugees (IDA18 Regional 
Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities), which 
provides funding at 50 per cent grant and 50 per cent loan (low 
or no-interest) rates. The funding programme runs from 2017 
to 2020, includes Djibouti and Ethiopia, and aims to shift from 
crisis response to risk management, supporting host communi-
ties, moving toward social and economic inclusion and taking 
regional and country-level approaches (including as related to 
sustainable voluntary return).
MIDCOM migration dialogue, UNHCR’s CRRF, the NGO-led 
Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (for Burundi, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Uganda) and the World Bank’s IDA18 Regional 
Sub-Window (for Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda) are also 
of particular relevance in the East Africa context. Tanzania was 
also foreseen to be included as one of the first eight pilot coun-
tries of the CRRF, but retreated mid-way through the process 
citing insufficient donor funding and security concerns (Betts, 
2018; Ensor, 2018). The tripartite model has also been applied to 
protracted displacement situations in East Africa. Aside from the 
tripartite agreements on Sudanese refugees which includes the 
DRC, ten different tripartite agreements were concluded in 2002 
and 2003 between UNHCR, Rwanda and host states regarding 
Rwandan displacement (O’Connor, 2013; UNHCR, 2011).
Despite the huge variety of policy activity, efforts so far have 
failed to provide the necessary framework and secure enough 
resources to effectively address protracted displacement in Africa. 
The following country-specific boxes below illustrate that.
Over the last 10 years, Ethiopia’s national refugee response 
strategy has been a mix of three policy approaches: En-
campment policy, out-of-camp policy and local integration. 
The majority of refugees live in one of the 26 camps that are 
spread over the border regions of the country, in line with 
the country’s encampment policy. Besides being a signatory 
to refugee-specific instruments, Ethiopia is also signatory to 
many international and regional human rights and humani-
tarian law instruments, thereby reinforcing the protection of 
refugees (Admassu, 2009). 
Box	8:	Governance	of	protracted	displacement	in	Ethiopia
Until 2004, Ethiopia did not have a comprehensive legal 
framework or concrete national policies or rules to regulate 
situations of asylum-seekers and refugee (Teferra, 2017). 
Thus, following the international and regional refugee 
conventions to which Ethiopia is a party, the first refugee 
specific instrument was the National Refugee Proclamation 
No. 409/2004 enacted in 2004 (UNHCR, 2019a). This statute 
adopted and put in place many of the provisions of the inter-
national refugee conventions such as protection, the right 
to stay in Ethiopia, non-refoulement and the right to family 
unity (Tadesse & Gebremaria, 2017). 
However, the 2004 Refugee Proclamation was criticised 
for lacking comprehensive provisions on durable solutions, 
which included the absence of local integration (Taddele, 
2019; Teferra, 2017, pp. 97–98). As a result, Ethiopia revised 
its refugee law. Soon after the UN General Assembly agreed 
to the Refugee Compact in 2018, Ethiopia’s parliament 
adopted the revised National Refugee Proclamation No. 
1110/2019, in January 2019. This was marked as one of the 
most progressive refugee policies in Africa (Taddele, 2019; 
UNHCR, 2018e). 
Until 2002, the DRC did not have particular legislation 
regulating the position of refugees. Ad hoc commissions had 
sometimes existed in collaboration with refugees’ countries 
of origin (Maheshe, 2014). Maheshe (2014) argues that 
between 1960 and 2000-2005, the DRC did not have a clear 
migration policy and that about 70 per cent of the manage-
ment of refugees on Congolese territory was in the hands of 
international organisations such as UNHCR. 
In 2002, the DRC adopted its national refugee law, the Refugee 
Status Act. In its foreword, the law refers to the obligation of 
the Congolese state to respect its international engagements, 
notably the Refugee Convention and the African Union (AU)
Convention. The law also refers to the ‘legendary tradition 
of hospitality of the Congolese people’. In its definition of a 
refugee, the DRC follows the AU Convention in including 
aggression, foreign occupation or any other event infringing 
on the public order in a country or part thereof (Article 1). 
DRC’s National Refugee Commission (CNR) registers refu-
gees and asylum seekers and decides on people’s status.
Despite the DRC’s engagement with the Great Lakes Pro-
tocol and the Kampala Convention, and the high numbers of 
IDPs in the country, national legislation in this field has not 
yet come into force. Some pieces of legislation refer to IDPs 
and refugees as groups that need particular attention (2006 
Congolese Constitution, Article 202(n); 2009 Child Protec-
tion Code, Article 41). In September 2014, the Congolese 
state published a Draft Law on the Protection and Assis-
tance of Internally Displaced Persons, but thus far the law 
has not been adopted. 
Box	9:	Governance	of	protracted	displacement	in	the	DR	Congo
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3.2		Exercising	rights	and	accessing	services
Across the Horn of Africa and East Africa regions, many 
countries have implemented national encampment policies. 
While these are national approaches, they do reflect a regional 
trend. As such, several countries have also put in place barriers 
to restrict mobility from camps, although for some groups 
such mobility restrictions were removed, or they were deemed 
eligible for permits to leave camps. This includes those with 
special needs (e.g. medical reasons), as well as South Sudanese 
refugees in Sudan or Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia due to the 
Out-of-Camp policies established by governments (Samuel Hall 
Consulting, 2014). In line with the encampment approach, most 
countries in the region also restrict refugees’ access to employ-
ment opportunities. In recent years, however, countries in the 
region have moved away from the encampment model and also 
promoted approaches that focus on supporting the self-reliance 
of refugees. 
Yet, protracted displacement and the long-standing presence of 
humanitarian actors in the region have contributed to a counter- 
productive approach in the region of ‘wait and see’ (‘esprit 
d’attentisme’). In this context, programmes that promote 
self-reliance and livelihood development have been difficult 
to implement, as many humanitarian agencies still provide 
basic goods for free (Bulte, Hilhorst, Berg, van den Jacobs, 
Leuveld, & Weijs, 2015; Derderian & Schockaert, 2010). This 
wait-and-see comportment has been interpreted as potentially 
detrimental to mobility and initiatives to return or resettle.
Tanzania has signed and ratified three major treaties on 
refugees; the 1951 UN Convention and its related 1967 
Protocol, the 1969 OUA Convention on Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems and the 2006 Great Lakes Pact on Sta-
bility, Peace and Development (Nairobi Pact). Of this pact, 
two protocols are particularly relevant: the Protocol on 
the property rights of returnees and the Protocol on IDPs. 
Although Tanzania has ratified these protocols and is thus 
supposed to implement them domestically, this has not yet 
materialised (Kamanga, 2014; IDMC & IRRI, 2008). 
The first national refugee legislation in Tanzania dates back 
to the 1966 Refugees (Control) Act (Mendel, 1997; Peter, 
1997, pp. 86–88). It was replaced in 1998 by a new Refugees 
Act. Until today, however, the act has not been followed up 
by the gazetting of Rules and Regulations. Compared to the 
1966 Act, the contemporary Act is far more forward-looking. 
Not only is the draconian-sounding word ‘control’ aban-
doned in the title, but unlike the preceding legislation, one 
also finds explicit mention of both UNHCR and OAU, as 
well as the welcome inclusion of certain rights and free-
doms of asylum-seekers and refugees (Kamanga, 2005, p. 
105). It is a striking feature of the 1998 Refugees Act that it 
does not contain provisions explicitly dedicated to ‘durable 
solutions’. This is noteworthy because international refugee 
law imposes a legal obligation committing States Parties 
and other actors (such as UNHCR) to keep searching for a 
lasting solution to the refugee problem. Tucked at the tail of 
the 1998 Act are two provisions, one specifically addressing 
voluntary repatriation (Sect. 34) and the other resettlement 
(Sect. 36), while eschewing altogether the widely acknowl-
edged alternative of ‘local integration’.
The Refugees Act foresees the instalment of a National Eligi-
bility Committee (NEC), responsible for the administration 
of matters concerning asylum-seekers and refugees. This 
committee operates under the purview of the Ministry for 
Home Affairs. The NEC provides recommendations to the 
Minister about asylum claims, requests for family reunifica-
tion and resettlement. 
Box	10:	Governance	of	protracted	displacement	in	Tanzania
Ethiopia’s new refugee law replaces the country's 2004 Ref-
ugee Proclamation and grants the country's massive refugee 
population access to a wide range of services and improved 
local socio-economic integration, including the right to em-
ployment. According to the 2019 Proclamation, refugees can 
stay as long as they wish. Upon arrival, they have to register 
as a refugee or asylum-seeker with the Refugee Authority. 
Those who have lived in Ethiopia for 20 years or more will 
be allowed citizenship. They will also be able to obtain civil 
documentation, such as certificates for births, deaths and 
marriages. The Proclamation foresees that a refugee who is 
lawfully resident in Ethiopia shall not be expelled except on 
the ground of national security and public order.
Despite all the support that is provided, several challenges 
remain. Education is free, but lack of documents and cre-
dentials makes it difficult for refugees to access education at 
the appropriate level. Others point out that food assistance 
does not meet minimum standards (UNHCR, 2018a).
Box	11:	Exercising	rights	and	accessing	services	in	Ethiopia
A mapping exercise on laws and policies on internal dis-
placement carried out by IDMC in 2015/2016 shows no par-
ticular policy on internal displacement in the Congo (Giorgi, 
2016), despite the abundant presence of humanitarian actors 
in the east of DRC. The DRC government in recent years has 
been criticised for being ‘unable and unwilling to provide 
assistance’ (White, 2014). Protracted displacement has been 
effectively ignored in all these policies and debates.
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According to the 2002 Refugee Status Act, recognised refugees 
can obtain a Refugee Identity Card (Carte d’Identité pour 
Réfugié, CIRE) and a document providing a right to travel 
(‘titre de voyage’) (Article 27). The CIRE is supposed to have 
the same status as a residence permit for other foreigners 
(Article 28). Refugees are supposed to have the same rights 
as Congolese citizens, to carry out professional activities, 
get social assistance, access to health care and education, 
as well as the freedom of movement. The latter is limited to 
administrative restrictions that apply to other foreigners 
as well. Higher education can be accessed at the same cost 
as nationals (Article 32). Refugees can resort to courts and 
tribunals in the Congo in the same way as nationals (Article 
33). Finally, refugees and their family members may obtain 
civil documents, such as birth, death and marriage certifi-
cates (Article 34).
In the light of the Humanitarian Response Plan 2017-2019, 
the responses of the international community have not been 
limited to refugees only: Most of the targeted beneficiaries 
of the interventions are IDPs and to a much smaller extent 
returnees (UNOCHA, 2017). Active thematic clusters of 
humanitarian response are shelter, water, sanitation and 
hygiene (WASH), education, logistics, nutrition, protection, 
health, food security, refugee responses. Although the 
cluster approach has been assessed as contributing to some 
systemic improvement in coordinated humanitarian response 
(Stoddard, Harmer, Haver, Salomons, & Wheeler, 2007), 
more critical voices can be heard as well. The Humanitarian 
Response Plan is supposed to be operationalised with 208 
humanitarian partners in the field, 115 of them are national 
NGOs, 61 international NGOs, 15 are UN agencies, two 
international organisations, two are part of the Red Cross, 
and 13 are state actors (Stoddard et al., 2007, p. 16). An 
important development in the humanitarian field in the DRC 
in the last decade has been the introduction of monetary as-
sistance. It provides more flexibility to the displaced persons 
to address their most urgent needs (UNOCHA, 2017, p. 38).
Box	12:	Exercising	rights	and	accessing	services	in	the	DR	
Congo
Beside those refugees who are urban-based (about 270), 
Barundi people who are located in the Old Settlements of 
Katumba, Mishamo and Ulyankulu (19,150) and a further 
23,000 who are self-settled in villages in Kigoma, the vast 
majority of refugees are, consistent with the law and prac-
tice, found in camps and have limited mobility (UNHCR, 
2018b). The Refugees Act specifies the scope of rights these 
encamped refugees enjoy, in particular as regards freedom 
of movement. Rather than an exception, encampment (‘Des-
ignated Areas’) is mandatory (as opposed to the relevant 
Box	13:	Exercising	rights	and	accessing	services	in	Tanzania
laws in Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Uganda), and refugees 
may only absent themselves with the written permission of 
the camp commander. Unauthorised absence constitutes a 
punishable offence. Camp commanders who reside within 
the camp compounds or close by survey compliance.
An emerging trend in refugee policy is the importance and 
prioritisation given to the phenomenon of ‘mixed migra-
tion flows’ and ‘irregular migration’. In consequence, the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM)’s role and 
visibility in migration policy have been enhanced over time. 
But while the 1990s ushered in forward-looking refugee-spe-
cific laws, policy and practices increasingly betray a pattern 
of restrictionism and securitisation of migration to the point 
of marking a clear departure of the erstwhile ‘open door 
policy’ that had once characterised the region (the prestig-
ious UNHCR Nansen Award bestowed on Tanzania in 1983 
is illustrative of this). It leaves little room for the migra-
tion-development nexus within the policy debate. Where 
guidelines exist, such as the Tanzania National Refugee 
Policy of 2003, they eschew this nexus altogether, focusing, 
on the contrary, on the ‘burden’ of hosting refugees.
3.3		Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	
displacement
In general, there is a dearth of regional approaches that address 
livelihood (in)security and immobility in protracted displace-
ment, with most information available at the national level. For 
the DRC, for which internal displacement is a significant issue, 
the suspicion of movements of Burundians and Rwandans, as 
well as citizenship restrictions (particularly of the Rwanda-
phone minority) have had an impact on mobility in the country 
and region (Hoefsloot, 2016; Jackson, 2007; Maheshe, 2014).
Countries in the Horn of Africa and East Africa tend to have 
large diaspora communities within and outside the region. 
Diasporas from Djibouti and Kenya are more likely to live 
outside of Africa, particularly in the United States and Europe 
(Marchand, Reinold, & Dias e Silva, 2017). There are some 
studies on transnational links and networks among countries 
in the region, but few region-wide initiatives, projects and 
programmes have focused on such networks (Hammond, 2014; 
for transnational links with diaspora communities outside the 
region see Horst, 2007; Warnecke & Schmitz-Pranghe, 2010). 
Furthermore, IGAD has begun national consultations on a 
Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons within the region 
and have updated the draft and paired it with a roadmap for 
implementation in 2019 (Dick & Schraven, 2019). Its adoption 
and implementation are also considered to contribute signifi-
cantly to achieving some of the objectives of the IGAD Nairobi 
Declaration on Somali refugees, in particular to creating “an 
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enabling environment for safe, sustainable and voluntary return 
and reintegration of Somali refugees” (Intergovernmental  
Authority on Development, 2017). Importantly, the African 
Union has set up a protocol on free movement within Africa, 
which awaits ratification by at least 15 member states before it 
enters into force (African Union, 2019; Getachew, 2019).
Within the EU’s resettlement scheme, the EU pledged to focus 
on resettling the most vulnerable refugees from a variety of 
countries, including Ethiopia and Sudan (European Commis-
sion, 2017c). Similarly, UNHCR prioritises resettlement from 
the region. A Core Group for Enhanced Resettlement and Com-
plementary Pathways along the Central Mediterranean route 
was established in 2017, which included global resettlement 
states, the IOM, the EU and UNHCR (UNHCR, 2017b, 2018c). 
The Group looks at resettlement responses covering West, East, 
North Africa and the Horn of Africa.
The use of mobile technologies to support refugee communi-
ties is very country-specific (and also depends on each coun-
try’s mobile network coverage), but international organisations 
are increasingly engaging such technology for providing hu-
manitarian aid (like the World Food Programme and UNHCR 
schemes in Kenya). Some mobile applications have also been 
piloted in the Kakuma camp in Kenya, one of which aimed to 
trace family members and family reunification (e.g. Find Me 
App). Most of such pilot projects engaging mobile technology, 
however, have taken place in Kenya and cannot be considered 
regional in scope. Conversely, the use of M-Pesa as a way of 
transferring money via mobile phones (which was set up in 
Kenya) is quite widespread in many countries in the region, 
including Tanzania and the DRC. These technologies can thus 
be considered as a vital infrastructure for many migrants and 
displaced people.
Family and kinship networks have played a vital role in the 
region and have been observed in settlement patterns among 
refugees in Uganda, South Sudan and refugee camps, as well 
as among IDPs in the DRC (Clark-Kazak, 2011; Coates, 2014; 
Jacobs & Paviotti, 2017; Lyytinen, 2013). Research done in the 
region has highlighted informal oral communication (‘radio 
trottoir’) as the most common form of communication among 
Congolese young people in Uganda (Clark-Kazak, 2011). It 
was considered even more effective than the Ugandan Red 
Cross messaging service and served as a means for refugees to 
obtain information on applying for refugee status and accessing 
services.
Family reunification is a major driver of refugee mobility. A 
UNHCR report shows that several new arrivals from Eritrea 
cited family-reunification with relatives residing in Ethiopia 
or third countries as a secondary motivation for their deci-
sion to flee (UNHCR, 2019a). Ethiopia has legally accepted 
the reunification of refugees and asylum-seekers with 
their families. For instance, Article 12 of the 2004 Refugee 
Proclamation permits family members of refugees and asy-
lum-seekers to enter and remain in the country. According 
to the Proclamation, once they have entered, “they shall be 
entitled to all the rights and be subject to all the duties of a 
recognized refugee” (Article 12, No. 4). 
Whereas the 2004 Proclamation used a narrow definition of 
the family (and has been criticised for doing so), the revised 
2019 Proclamation uses a broader definition, stating that 
a family member can be “any person, the agency may con-
sider, upon assessment, as a member of family taking into 
account the meaning of a family in the laws of their country 
of origin and the existence of dependency among them” 
(Article II, No. 9). 
Encampment policy, still the dominant approach, hampers 
the mobility of refugees. Since 2010, an out-of-camp policy, 
applying to Eritrean refugees only, has been in place. Ini-
tially, it was meant for young refugees who came from urban 
areas of Eritrea, able to cover their costs of living, and for 
those who were granted scholarships with some pocket 
money from UNHCR. The scheme encouraged self-sufficient 
Eritrean refugees to choose and settle in any part of the 
country including urban areas (Berhanu, 2017). Since the re-
opening of the Eritrean-Ethiopian border after the signing of 
the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship in July 2018, 
the number of Eritrean refugees has been increasing rapidly. 
This policy does not apply to urban refugees from other 
countries, leaving them in a state of limbo (Berhanu, 2017). 
Since the revised Refugee Proclamation, freedom of move-
ment has improved for non-Eritrean refugees as well. Refu-
gees and asylum-seekers now have the right to choose their 
residence and the right to freedom of movement. This will be 
further elaborated in the ten-year National Comprehensive 
Refugee Response Strategy (NCRRS), which aims to apply a 
more integrated model of assistance (UNHCR, 2019a).
In June 2018, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a peace declara-
tion ending the state of war between the two countries. In 
response, many Eritreans went to Ethiopia to reunite with 
their families (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019). While this 
can be considered more a bilateral development than a re-
gional one, it has served as an important regional develop-
ment considering the protracted displacement of Eritreans in 
the region. Otherwise, mobility within the region, especially 
considering the encampment policies, tends to be informal 
and use unofficial channels within each respective country.
Box	14:	Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	displacement	
in	Ethiopia
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A distinguishing element of the Congolese refugee legisla-
tion is Article 3(2), which stipulates that “dependants and 
family members who join or live together with the refugee/
chief of the family will benefit from the same status”. How-
ever, each case will be decided upon individually.
Mobility is a survival strategy for many people in eastern 
DRC and many people have been displaced repeatedly in 
their lives (Rudolf, Jacobs, & Nguya, 2014), leading to what 
Raeymaekers (2012, p. 4) describes as “a ‘hyper-mobile’ 
form of livelihood”. This form of livelihood, however, is far 
from being supported by the infrastructure in the country; 
with only one kilometre of paved road per 1,000 square kilo-
metres of land surface, the DRC is a country with a poorly 
paved road network (Ferf, Hilhorst, & Mashanda, 2014). Its 
roads are dotted with a high number of roadblocks, where 
either state or non-state actors levy taxes that allow people 
access to the road itself, to markets, or that guarantee 
security along the road (Schouten, 2019; Schouten, Murairi, 
Jaillon, A., & Kubuya, 2017). Identity cards that show some-
body’s origin can be an important token for gaining access 
to a certain road. Without the right origin, access might be 
restricted or at one’s own risk. 
The protractedness of displacement in the east makes it 
difficult to promote return as a durable solution, but it can 
also hinder local integration and resettlement. White (2014), 
for instance, states that:
[a]lthough there is a growing dialogue among human-
itarians about stepping up activities both to support 
the voluntary return of certain IDPs and to reinforce 
the indigenous coping strategies of people who cannot 
return, there is little agreement about what these return 
and resilience-boosting activities might look like, who 
would lead them, and how they would be funded.
In sum, mobility in eastern Congo can be seen as part of a 
livelihood strategy, but a strategy that is little supported by 
the institutional and legal frameworks of protection. 
Box	15:	Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	displacement	
in	the	DR	Congo
The protracted nature of the refugee situation and cyclical 
nature of refugee inflows in Tanzania seem to suggest there 
are ‘pull factors’ working as mobility factors. One such ‘pull 
factor’ may be the close ethnic ties between refugees (from 
Burundi and DRC) and host communities. Another one may be 
found in the century-old cross-border movements, from the 
time when Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanganyika (as Tanzania 
was then known) constituted Deutsch-Ostafrika, a German 
colony that only disintegrated following Germany’s defeat in 
World War I. A third relevant factor may relate to the excep-
tionally long and porous borders Tanzania shares with its 
eight overland neighbours, including Burundi and the DRC. 
The common border with Burundi runs for 589 km, while 
that with the DRC stretches for 479 km. Tanzania’s coastline 
on the Indian Ocean measures around 1,400 km, which is 
perhaps a key factor in explaining the nation’s position as a 
transit country for migrants from the Horn of Africa region, 
as they attempt to reach South Africa. A fourth factor may 
be connected to the fact that Tanzania was the first country 
in the sub-region to free itself from colonial rule, coupled 
with the pan-Africanist ideas espoused and practised by its 
post-independence leadership. Finally, the relative stability 
and tranquillity Tanzania continues to uninterruptedly enjoy 
is also likely to play a role in attracting inflows.
Box	16:	Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	displacement	
in	Tanzania
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ment with UNRWA stems from longer-term engagement on the 
issue of Palestinian displacement. In 1950, the League Reso-
lution 325 called on all host states to cooperate with UNRWA. 
In subsequent resolutions (389 of 1951 and 462 of 1952), the 
League touched on durable solutions to Palestinian refugee dis-
placement as related to UNRWA’s mandate, noting that Pales-
tinians’ right of return should be respected, living standards in 
host countries should not be negatively impacted and UNRWA 
projects should not specify any requirements for permanent 
residence (Akram, 2014; Al Husseini, 2007). This also reflects 
political orientation as related to durable solutions for Pales-
tinian refugees: The right of return is held up as the overarching 
principle for Palestinians and as such, integration and resettle-
ment (tawteen) are not considered acceptable solutions.
The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is a con-
fessional-based organisation with members from across the 
Middle East, South and East Asia and North and Central 
Africa. It has engaged less overtly on refugee issues. In 1994, 
the OIC adopted a Resolution on the Problem of Refugees in 
the Muslim World calling on its member states to cooperate 
with UNHCR. In 2005, they also held a Ministerial Conference 
on the Problems of Refugees in the Muslim World calling for 
ways to enhance protection for refugees in OIC member states 
(UNHCR & Organization of the Islamic Conference Secre-
tariat, 2005). It also introduced an Agenda for Protection and 
programme of action for follow-up. However, no information 
on an evaluation of this programme was available. A similar 
conference was organised in 2012 and resulted in the Ashgabat 
Declaration, which particularly emphasised the durable solu-
tions of repatriation and resettlement and called for improved 
cooperation of OIC member states with UNHCR (Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation, 2012). 
The Arab Regional Consultative Process on Migration and 
Refugees Affairs also serves as a platform for the engagement 
of states within the Middle East and the wider Arab world to 
discuss issues related to international migration, including 
asylum, displacement and forced migration. It is made up of 22 
states in the Middle East, North and East Africa (Syria is cur-
rently suspended), while the Arab League serves as Chair and 
Secretariat. It has regular consultative meetings on a variety 
of migration topics and contributes to other informal consul-
tative processes (such as the Global Forum for Migration and 
Development), as well as to both the Refugee Compact and the 
Migration Compact. In their contribution to the Refugee Com-
pact, they emphasised the need for improved support to host 
countries and communities and the importance of all durable 
solutions (return, integration and resettlement).
4.	Governing	displacement	in	the	
Middle	East
4.1		Governing	protection
Within the Middle East region, the non-signature of the Refugee 
Convention has meant that displacement issues are in prac-
tice addressed by national legislation and often a MoU with 
UNHCR. Refugees are often dealt with as temporary visitors or 
‘guests’ and, as such, there is an absence of policies on refugee 
inclusion or integration (Mason, 2011; Mathew & Harley, 2016). 
Moreover, considering the extremely protracted displacement 
situation of Palestinian refugees in the region, efforts related 
to governing the displacement of refugees often refer to or are 
aimed at resolving issues related to Palestinian displacement 
(Al Husseini, 2007). Other protracted situations (such as those 
of Iraqis and Syrians) have not consistently been dealt with in 
terms of governance at the regional level.
In terms of regional institutions, the League of Arab States 
serves as a regional organisation across the Middle East, North 
Africa and Horn of Africa (Syria is currently suspended). The 
Arab League has developed a variety of regional instruments of 
relevance to refugees and protracted displacement. In 1965, the 
League adopted the Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians 
in Arab States (Casablanca Protocol), which aimed to ensure 
Palestinians’ access to rights in their host countries. This 
includes the right to work, to leave and return to the host state, 
as well as the right to documentation. The Protocol, however, 
was never implemented and has been more or less overturned 
by the League’s 1991 Resolution 5093, which reiterates that 
Palestinians are subject to national laws (Al Husseini, 2007; 
Mejri, 2018).
In 1992, the League adopted the Declaration on the Protec-
tion of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World 
and in 1994, the Arab Convention on Regulating the Status of 
Refugees in Arab Countries. While the former document notes 
‘displaced persons’ in tandem with refugees, the latter focuses 
exclusively on refugees. However, it broadens the refugee 
definition to include those displaced due to foreign aggression, 
occupation or dominance, as well as those displaced due to 
natural disasters or other disasters disrupting public order. The 
Convention has never entered into force. In 2018, the League, in 
cooperation with UNHCR, developed an updated Convention 
draft and discussed a final draft and adoption process, foreseen 
to “help in determining the regional responses” (League of 
Arab States, 2018).
The League has also engaged with the main international actors 
involved in the region, namely UNHCR and UNRWA. In 2000, 
UNHCR and the League signed an agreement to enhance their 
cooperation, and in 2017, they signed an MoU aiming to estab-
lish a cooperation framework to respond to issues of refugees in 
the Arab region (UNHCR, 2001, 2017a). The League’s engage-
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In response to the Syria crisis and refugee displacement within 
the Middle East region, the EU also launched a Regional 
Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) and a 
Comprehensive Regional Strategic Framework (CRSF) in 
the Middle East region (Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq) in 2014, aiming 
to bring together humanitarian and development funding and 
efforts in response to the Syrian refugee crisis (European 
Commission, DG ECHO, 2014; Papadopoulou, 2015; Regional 
Development and Protection Programme, 2019; Zetter, Ru-
audel, Deardorff- Miller, Lyytinen, Thibos, & Pedersen, 2014). 
The RDPP focuses primarily on local integration through the 
promotion of employment opportunities, skills development 
and vocational training, infrastructure development (including 
for education, water, sanitation and energy) and on improving 
the protection of refugees and IDPs (Syrian, Iraqi) in the region 
(European Resettlement Network, 2007). While the framework 
is regional, most projects under the RDPP are national in scope 
and focus. These efforts echoed again the need for more devel-
opment planning in response to protracted displacement. 
The CRSF was criticised for being unsuccessful in achieving a 
comprehensive and sustainable response (Voluntas Advisory, 
2016). Yet, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) 
was developed to implement the CRSF principles across Turkey, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. The 3RP is a “nationally-led, 
regionally coherent framework”, with country plans developed 
with the full involvement of the respective governments to ensure 
the buy-in of all countries engaged (3RP, 2018). These coun-
try-level plans outline each country’s needs, targets, approaches 
and resources and thus frame efforts to respond to Syrian 
refugees’ (Refugee Component) and host communities’ needs 
(Resilience Component) in each country. Across the five coun-
tries, UNHCR and UNDP co-lead and coordinate, with UNHCR 
focusing on the refugee component and UNDP on the resilience 
component, while 270 humanitarian and development actors are 
partners to the approach. The 3RP (and RDPP) differ from the 
other regional arrangements noted here, as the former serves 
as a coordination platform for crisis response and the latter as a 
funding arrangement across multiple countries in a region. 
The very serious situations of protracted displacement in the 
Middle East have attracted various policy and legal responses, 
but with little success in practice. Jordan is one example of this.
Jordan is not party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, nor 
to the 1967 Protocol, as the exclusion of Palestinian refugees 
from both UNHCR’s statutes and the Refugee Convention 
has been a major disincentive for Arab states to accede to it. 
It also does not have specific domestic legislation targeting 
refugees. Asylum-seekers are provided protection according 
to Article 21(1) of the Jordanian Constitution that states that 
“[p]olitical refugees shall not be extradited on account of 
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their political beliefs or for their defence of liberty. More-
over, Law No. 24 of 1973 concerning Residency and For-
eigners’ Affairs states that persons with international access 
permits from the UN are allowed to enter Jordan as refugees 
(Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs Department, 1973). The 
legal framework governing the treatment of refugees in 
Jordan is the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding signed 
between Jordan and UNHCR (Saliba, 2016). This mem-
orandum obligates the Jordanian government to provide 
protection and assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers, 
giving them the right to reside for six months or to find a 
lasting solution to their problems (Akram & Rempe, 2004; 
UNHCR, 2015b).
The implementation of refugee policy in Jordan relies 
heavily on the interventions of UNHCR through which ref-
ugees receive relief items and cash assistance. The UNRWA 
is in charge of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, whereas 
other refugees fall under the mandate of UNHCR. Iraqi and 
Syrian refugees have been granted temporary protection 
upon request of UNHCR. Temporary investment laws have 
allowed some Iraqi refugees to obtain Jordanian citizenship, 
but most Iraqis have only obtained residence permits. Syrian 
refugees receive registration cards from UNHCR and some-
times refugee status certificates. Everybody needs to be able 
to provide proof of residence on Jordanian territory.
An important policy instrument is the Jordan Response 
Plan for the Syria crisis (JRP). This plan “provides a three-
year vision to ensure that critical humanitarian measures 
and medium-term interventions are better integrated, 
sequenced and complemented” (Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation, 2019). The JRP pays particular 
attention to unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable 
groups. The platform that is charged with the execution of 
the plan is led by the Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation. 
To deal with the major influx of Syrian refugees, the Council 
of Ministers established a special department, the Admin-
istration of the Syrian Refugee Camps, aimed to improve 
the services provided to Syrian refugees and ensure the 
proper functioning of this field. The department established 
new camps to accommodate the large numbers of refugees 
(AlHamoud, 2015). When refugees cross the border, military 
units transfer them to refugee reception centres, where they 
are given food, water and medical care. Since most of these 
refugees do not have passports, identity documents, birth 
certificates or family records, they will be given a receipt 
in the reception centres that allows the army to take them 
to refugee camps. In these camps, Syrian refugees receive 
humanitarian, curative and educational services by the Jor-
danian government and UNHCR, sometimes supported by 
other international relief organisations, such as NRC, IRC 
and IOM (AlHamoud, 2015). 
TRAFIG working paper no.3  •  01/2020  •  30
4.3		Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	
displacement
There are no frameworks and programmes at the regional level 
that facilitate transnational networks through connectivity and/
or mobility. This is despite the fact that, by and large, vio-
lence-induced mobility mainly takes place within the same re-
gion. The following examples represent at best bilateral (rather 
than regional) approaches to mobility.
Historically, there was an ‘open door’ policy between Syria and 
Lebanon, allowing for circulation and regular circular migra-
tion between the two countries. This facilitated the mainte-
nance of broader family and community networks across the 
border (De Bel-Air, 2017). However, Lebanon implemented 
new visa rules as of early 2015, effectively ending this par-
ticular cross-border mobility. 
4.2		Exercising	rights	and	accessing	services
Policies and frameworks dealing with livelihood insecurity in 
protracted displacement situations in the Middle East remain 
largely within the purview of national governments. Nonethe-
less, there are several trends or recent developments that impact 
on this situation. More concretely, UNHCR has partnered with 
the League of Arab States to achieve universal birth registration in 
the region considering the impact that non-registration has on 
the protection of refugee children, for instance with regard to 
access to healthcare and education as well as family reunifica-
tion. In 2018, the League of Arab States issued the Declaration 
on Belonging and Legal Identity, which affirms the commit-
ment of member states to ensure that all children are registered 
at birth (3RP, 2019). Moreover, under the EU’s RDPP in the 
region, the thematic area of livelihoods comprises the majority 
of partnerships and projects across the three countries of imple-
mentation. This involved, in particular, employment generation 
schemes, as well as vocational training and job placement 
(Regional Development and Protection Programme, 2014).
Across the region, most countries maintain an encampment 
policy, or refugees settle in urban areas. The exception is Leb-
anon, although it maintains an encampment policy for Pales-
tinian refugees. Moreover, since 2014/2015, countries in the 
region have tended to impose increased restrictions on (Syrian) 
refugees in their respective countries, which has impacted 
Syrians’ mobility into andout of camps or the country. Similar 
restrictions can be observed in Israel for Palestinians living in 
the West Bank whose partners or family members live in Occu-
pied Territories (B’Tselem, 1999). These developments do not 
reflect a regional framework or structural approach, but rather a 
trend in the region.
Historically, (non-Palestinian) refugees have accessed ser-
vices such as education and health services in host countries 
as ‘guests’ (De Bel-Air, 2017; Hendow, 2010). Yet, in recent 
years, with increased displacement—of Iraqis and Syrians in 
particular—in the region, access to these services has become 
more restricted. Again, these represent national approaches but 
were common across several countries in the Middle East. 
Upon arrival in Jordan, displaced persons are given a Proof 
of Registration (PoR) card as an identity card. The PoR card 
allows people to remain in the camps. To live outside the 
camps, eligible Syrian refugees need an asylum-seeker cer-
tificate provided by UNHCR. The document entitles them to 
access services and assistance provided outside the camps 
by UNHCR and humanitarian agencies. The refugee status 
certificate was replaced with the new Ministry of the Interior 
Service Cards (MoI card) after 2014. The MoI card is a 
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particularly important piece of legal documentation because 
possession of a card confirms that its holder is officially enti-
tled to live outside refugee camps (NRC & IHRC, 2016).
Most Palestinians in Jordan—except for those coming from 
Gaza—have obtained full citizenship status by royal decree 
in Jordan and are thus considered citizens of the country 
and enjoy protection under this status (ARDD, 2015). This 
sets Palestinian refugees in Jordan somewhat apart from 
other refugees in the country. In 2019, UNHCR and the 
Jordanian government issued an additional legal protection 
document that is supposed to provide further legal safe-
guards.
Registered asylum-seekers and refugees are supposed to 
benefit from a range of rights, such as being registered with 
UNHCR, obtaining a residence permit and civil documents, 
not to be subjected to arrest or deportation, protection from 
attacks, health care and education. In recent years, with the 
ongoing influx of Syrian refugees, the Jordanian govern-
ment has restricted some of the services offered to refugees. 
Healthcare, for instance, was provided free of charge for 
registered Syrians, but since 2014, they have to pay the 
same rates as non-insured Jordanians. It underlines the 
pressure that is put on the provision of basic services by the 
Jordanian state because of the high number of refugees. To 
relieve some pressure on Jordanian society, efforts are made 
to promote employment of Syrian refugees, as this can be 
beneficial for the Jordanian economy (Grawert, 2019; Stave 
& Hillesund, 2015), and at the same time contribute to local 
integration as a durable solution (Lenner & Turner, 2019). 
Most Syrians, however, end up in sectors where the pay 
is low, such as the agricultural sector (23 per cent) or the 
construction section (19.4 per cent) (Alhajahmad, Barker, 
Lockhart, & Shore, 2018). Syrians living in refugee camps 
are not entitled to work permits (De Bel-Air, 2016).
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For Palestinians, an agreement between the Palestinian Lib-
eration Organisation (PLO) and Arab Gulf countries levied a 
five per cent tax on Palestinians who were working in those 
countries. These funds were then transferred to the Palestinian 
National Fund, whose activities have been criticised by Israel 
for providing compensation to families of Palestinians killed 
by Israelis (Issacharoff, 2019). This has apparently incentivised 
mobility and job opportunities for Palestinians in Gulf countries. 
The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement—a 
Palestinian-led movement calling for boycotts, divestment and 
sanctions as a form of non-violent pressure on Israel—has also 
been an effective means to engage Palestinians across the globe 
in activism related to the Palestinian cause.
Freedom of movement in Jordan has gradually become 
more restricted since 2014. Upon registration, refugees 
who have crossed the border are taken to refugee reception 
centres by the army. Refugees who have been in displace-
ment for longer periods of time, such as Palestinian and 
Iraqi refugees, have more freedom to move to areas outside 
of camps, and—under certain conditions—are allowed to 
possess property. Many of them live in urban areas (Alnsour 
& Meaton, 2014). Movement back and forth between Syria 
and Jordan is not possible; individuals who had returned to 
Syria have to register again as new refugees when they enter 
Jordan. 
Family reunification is a challenge for many Syrians 
when they lack civil documents. If a birth certificate is not 
available, or if a marriage is not formally registered, they 
cannot apply for reunification. Although registered refugees 
have the right to obtain civil documents, this can be com-
plicated in practice and constitute a burden with serious 
consequences. For instance, a couple who married in Syria 
without any formal registration is also not able to register 
their children who are born in Jordan, which impacts on 
the child’s access to services and the ability of the family to 
travel together. 
Box	19:	Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	displace-
ment	in	Jordan
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As in the Middle East, there is no regional legal framework on 
refugees, unlike in other regions. However, as seen with these 
tripartite agreements, UNHCR has been key in engaging across 
the region on Afghan refugees. Above all, these efforts have 
emphasised and facilitated return as the most desired durable 
solution (despite the varied circumstances in Afghanistan over 
the years). Indeed, tripartite agreements have been evaluated as 
a crucial agenda-setter on refugee policies in the region and on 
the support of governments to control population movements 
(International Crisis Group, 2009).
The World Bank has also established a fund available for refu-
gees and communities in low-income countries that host large 
numbers of refugees (IDA18 Regional Sub-Window for Ref-
ugees and Host Communities). The funding programme runs 
from 2017 to 2020 and includes Pakistan, but one of the main 
aims of the programme is to apply regional approaches where 
possible (and as related to sustainable voluntary return).  
5.	Governing	displacement	in	
South	Asia
5.1		Governing	protection
Within the South Asian region, regional regimes impacting 
on protracted displacement are mainly about Afghan refu-
gees (Grawert & Mielke, 2018). These regimes often focus on 
return or repatriation, considering the governments of Iran and 
Pakistan’s emphasis on return especially in recent years. At the 
political level, tripartite agreements have been an impor-
tant instrument and the legal basis for UNHCR’s repatriation 
programme as of the 2000s. The Tripartite Agreement between 
UNHCR, Afghanistan and Pakistan (extended in June 2019) 
provides the framework for the repatriation of Afghans and 
governs the stay of Afghans in Pakistan. A similar agreement 
is in place between UNHCR, Afghanistan and Iran to the same 
purpose (Ahmed, 2019).
In 2012, the tripartite approach was complemented by a 
regional policy framework Solutions Strategy for Afghan 
Refugees (SSAR) based on an agreement between UNHCR, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. This is the current primary 
regional framework regarding Afghan displacement in the 
region. The SSAR evolved from a previous policy Afghan 
Management Repatriation Strategy (2010-2012), which was not 
effectively implemented but which, for the first time, empha-
sised development aspects. Focused on return and long-term 
reintegration, and currently in its third implementation phase, 
the SSAR policy framework officially focuses on enhancing the 
absorption capacity of Afghanistan for reintegration, building 
refugees’ capacities and providing livelihood opportunities, and 
enhancing support for refugee-hosting communities in Pakistan 
and Iran and for resettlement in third countries (UNHCR, 
2015a, 2018d). 
All four entities (UNHCR and the governments of Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and Iran) coordinate SSAR, while National Steering 
Committees were established in 2014 to develop coun-
try-specific portfolios based on the regional approach. These 
Committees included representatives of the mandated minis-
tries involved in responding to displaced persons, return and 
reintegration issues in their respective countries. The SSAR 
has become a platform for engagement of over 60 humanitarian 
and development actors, UN agencies, international organisa-
tions and international and national NGOs (UNHCR, 2018d). 
The SSAR framework represents a highly relevant regional 
framework for addressing protracted displacement in the sense 
that it engages durable solutions (but above all return) as the 
main framework to solve protracted displacement of Afghans. 
It reflects a shift in focus from humanitarian emergency aid 
to more sustainable development activities for Afghans and 
refugee-hosting communities, and a wide range of stakeholders 
and the donor community also indicating international burden- 
sharing in the region.
The Pakistani government, in conjunction with UNHCR, 
is working on the implementation of the government’s 
Comprehensive Policy on Voluntary Repatriation and 
Management of Afghan Nationals that was signed in 2017. 
UNHCR’s main counterparts for refugees within the gov-
ernment of Pakistan are the Ministry of States and Frontier 
Regions, the Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees at 
the federal level and the Commissionerate’s for Afghan Ref-
ugees, at the provincial level. UNHCR also works with the 
National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), Ministry of the 
Interior (MoI) and the Economic Affairs Division (EAD). 
UNHCR implements activities via national and interna-
tional non-governmental organisations. 
Pakistan is not a party to the Refugee Convention or its 1967 
Protocol, neither has it enacted any national legislation for 
the protection of displaced persons. The Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan provides for two different 
categories of rights: civil and political rights. Civil rights 
are available to every person within the jurisdiction of 
Pakistan; political rights apply to citizens only. This implies 
that in theory, there is no difference between the entitlement 
to civil rights of displaced people who live in Pakistan and 
Pakistani citizens.
The Foreigners Act 1946 regulates the entry, exit and stay 
of foreigners in the country. The Act does not contain a 
definition of the terms ‘asylum’ or ‘refugee’ and describes 
Box	20:	Governance	of	protracted	displacement	in	Pakistan
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	5.3	Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	
displacement
Refugees are allowed to move freely anywhere in Pakistan. In 
the event of any security breach in the country or any unlikely 
event threatening peace and security, refugees can be searched 
at security checkpoints, similarly to the local population. 
Nonetheless, since January 2017, the government of Pakistan 
has imposed mobility restrictions on new entries, and the entry 
of Afghans has been made strictly subject to passport control, 
because of the security situation in the country. This passport 
and visa control has created severe issues for Afghan nationals, 
as most of their families have settled on the other side of the 
border and they wish to visit them frequently.
A very small percentage of Afghans have access to resettle-
ment schemes, as the criteria for resettlement are rigorous and 
refugees most often are unaware of these. This is where the 
UNHCR resettlement unit comes in, which holds awareness 
and dissemination of information sessions in different areas 
populated by refugees, advertised in different languages, with 
the aim to assist eligible refugees. The number of Afghan refu-
gees who are admitted by Western countries through resettle-
ment is clearly insufficient.
5.2	 Exercising	rights	and	accessing	services
When considering regional frameworks or programmes that 
may impact on livelihood (in)security and (im)mobility in the 
South Asian region, the above-described tripartite agreements 
and projects implemented under the SSAR are the most rele-
vant. Under the tripartite agreement with Pakistan, for instance, 
the UNHCR-assisted voluntary return package is annually 
advertised, and they have established Voluntary Repatriation 
Centres across the country as well as arrival centres in Afghan-
istan where returnees receive financial aid and assistance.
On the other hand, in recent years, deportations and forced 
returns from Iran and Pakistan have increased significantly, and 
xenophobic rhetoric has contributed to the fact that the situation 
for Afghan refugees in the countries has become more hostile. 
While these reflect more national than regional developments, 
they are common between the two countries.
every non-Pakistani as a ‘ foreigner’. In the absence of a 
national refugee legal framework, UNHCR determines 
refugee status under its mandate (Statute of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees adopted by 
the General Assembly Resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 
1950) and on behalf of the government of Pakistan in ac-
cordance with the 1993 Cooperation Agreement between the 
government of Pakistan and UNHCR. Pakistan generally 
accepts UNHCR’s decisions on refugee status and allows 
asylum-seekers as well as recognised refugees to remain in 
Pakistan pending identification of a durable solution.
In Pakistan, too, Proof of Registration (PoR) cards have 
been promoted as a major protection tool that provides 
temporary legal stay and freedom of movement for the reg-
istered Afghan refugees. The PoR cards were first issued in 
Pakistan in 2007 after a census of Afghan refugees. Initially, 
they were valid for two years, but the term has been fre-
quently extended by government notifications. These notifi-
cations are mostly issued at short notice which causes an in-
secure situation for refugees. In January 2018, for instance, 
the cards were extended for one month, then for three months 
until April, then for six months until November and then 
expired on 30 June 2019. These temporary arrangements are 
the biggest hurdle in formulating proper protection policy at 
the national and international level. The refugees with PoR 
cards are considered as temporarily protected refugees. Ref-
ugees without such a card are more prone to vulnerabilities. 
Afghan PoR cardholders enjoy basic health services, have 
access to education, the right of a fair trial, freedom of 
movement, right of earning a livelihood, issuance of SIM 
cards and, more recently, the right to open bank accounts. 
All the relevant institutions assist PoR cardholders in line 
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with the rights they are entitled to. The only challenge is 
in the field of education, where supply is not as high as de-
mand. Rights which are denied to Afghan refugees are those 
to own property and to obtain a driving licence.
Afghan refugees who arrived after 2015 are in a more 
vulnerable position, as they did not receive PoR cards but 
rather Afghan Citizen Cards (ACC). The status of these 
cards is not clear thus far, and there is no particular policy 
in place that determines their protection rights. Critics of 
ACC argue that these constitute means to better control the 
Afghan population in Pakistan and provide the basis for 
their legal, social and economic marginalisation (Alimia, 
2019).
Before 2015, refugees in Pakistan were able to move freely 
from one area to another and even rent houses in different 
cities without any legal requirement. But in 2015 the gov-
ernment adopted a National Action Plan named ‘the Punjab 
Information of Temporary Residents Act’. Due to its strict 
implementation, refugees face more difficulties when they 
want to rent a house. In practice, it makes it more difficult 
for them to find housing for rent, as landlords are reluctant 
to go through the hassle of registering all their tenants. At 
the same time, Afghan refugees are not allowed to purchase 
property themselves. As a result of this, they find it increas-
ingly difficult to move to a new place and to secure housing.
In 2017, a mass information campaign was launched to 
encourage Afghans to obtain passports at the Afghan consu-
lates in Pakistan. The Pakistani government, furthermore, 
started a campaign to document undocumented refugees.
TRAFIG working paper no.3  •  01/2020  •  34
A 2003 Tri-Partite Agreement between Pakistan, Afghani-
stan and UNHCR guides and regulates voluntary and gradual 
repatriation of registered Afghan refugees from Pakistan. 
Under this agreement, each returnee is entitled to US $200 from 
UNHCR. The UNHCR repatriation package is advertised in the 
daily newspapers in Pakistan annually, and voluntary repa-
triation centres (VRC) are established in different parts of the 
country where there are refugee settlements.
Finally, connections among Afghan associations abroad and 
between such associations and their networks in Afghanistan 
have facilitated Afghan transnational networks—and trans-
local linkages in particular. In Germany, after 2001, when local 
humanitarian and development projects were well supported 
in financial terms, Afghan associations boomed. Around 130 
Afghan-founded and/or -run associations operate in Germany. 
They engage with Afghan newcomers in Germany, returnees 
and the general population in Afghanistan and refugees in Pa-
kistan (Daxner & Nicola, 2017). Following the establishment of 
the internationally supported post-2001 government, President 
Karzai also addressed Afghan refugees in exile and called upon 
them to return in the context of reconstruction efforts (Afghan 
Interim Administration, 2001). In 2005, Presidential Decree 104 
allocated land for housing to returnees and IDPs (Government 
of Afghanistan, 2005), and tri- and bilateral agreements on the 
voluntary return of Afghans from neighbouring countries and 
Europe supported this (AAN Team, 2016). The actual imple-
mentation of this approach, however, has been hindered by 
a limited absorption capacity of national institutions and the 
economy, as well as re-emerging violent conflict. 
Transnational networks are particularly important for 
this region in terms of financial transfers, as the remit-
tance-sending corridor between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
is considered one of the most expensive worldwide (Plaza, 
Ratha, De, Ju Kim, Seshan, Yameogo, 2019). Moreover, the 
lack of documentation limits Afghans’ access to the formal 
banking system, and this has been an issue for Afghans in 
Iran and Pakistan in recent years. For this reason, Afghans 
tend to remit using the hawala informal transfer system, 
including Afghans in Iran (IOM, 2014).
Afghan refugees can open bank accounts in local banks and 
receive/send remittances from foreign countries (including 
Afghanistan) through registered Forex Exchange Com-
panies. Pakistan’s national, as well as commercial banks, 
have also opened branches in major cities in Afghanistan, 
through which refugees can send and receive remittances.
Box	22:Mobility	and	transnational	dimensions	of	displace-
ment	in	Pakistan:	Financial	flows
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the fact that the EU is playing an increasingly important role in 
the field of protracted displacement outside its jurisdiction, it 
has not yet been able to promote consistently effective solu-
tions. On the contrary, some of its interventions—particularly 
concerning Turkey and Libya—have arguably contributed to 
creating protracted displacement. 
6.2		Balancing	between	short-term	relief	and	
long-term	solutions
In our countries of study, return, as an option for the displaced, 
is only available to a limited extent due to ongoing insecurity in 
countries or regions of origin. Resettlement and local integra-
tion are thus the more viable solutions. Generally, displaced 
people in the countries we consider here seek refuge in host 
countries that have a certain level of cultural or ethnic affinity 
as this contributes to a more hospitable environment for them. 
In other words, this affinity might make local integration as 
a durable solution slightly easier than in settings where it is 
absent. 
One wonders, however, to what extent local integration can 
truly be achieved if people’s movements are limited to the 
confines of the refugee settlements in which they are supposed 
to reside. In both Ethiopia and Tanzania, the majority of refu-
gees live in camps and other types of refugee settlements. In 
the DRC, Jordan and Pakistan, however, where the majority of 
people on the move settle themselves in host communities, this 
applies to a more limited extent. In such settings, the provision 
of aid is usually more limited, but lives might come closer to a 
durable solution for the people concerned.
In the European context, the current CEAS instruments do not 
expressly address protracted displacement, but certainly are 
characterised by many elements and omissions that have an 
impact on the prospects of international protection seekers who 
obtain such protection and integrate in a new host country. As 
seen above, asylum seekers face multiple hurdles both from a 
legal and social perspective, not only delaying but often fully 
jeopardising stability and long-term solutions. Even leaving 
aside matters that fall outside the remit of EU competences, 
such as citizenship acquisition and the right to vote, the current 
CEAS instruments and respective implementation at domestic 
level clash with several norms of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU, including the right to dignity (Article 1), 
physical and mental integrity (Article 3), private and family life 
(Article 7), education (Article 14), and work (Article 15).
6		Selected	protection	gaps
6.1		Balancing	between	international	and	
national	demands
The previous sections highlighted a range of significant gaps 
in the global and regional protection systems, particularly 
concerning protracted displacement. Here, we analyse the most 
important of these gaps further and investigate how the global, 
regional and domestic levels of governance complement each 
other while still leaving protection gaps unaddressed. It seems 
that countries that are not signatories to the Refugee Conven-
tion or Protocol leave the most room for UNHCR to play a key 
role, not only in registration and status determination but also 
in the realisation of basic rights for refugees. The countries 
that are party to the Convention and Protocol are much more in 
the driving seat themselves when it comes to registration and 
status determination of refugees, but may also depend to a large 
extent on the international community for the provision of basic 
services to refugees. 
Internationally, the attention to IDPs came at a much later time 
than the attention to refugees. This is also reflected in a lack 
of national legislation and policy targeting IDPs, turning IDPs 
into a largely overlooked group. What might seem a paradox at 
first—why pay more attention to the fate of refugees than to the 
fate of your own citizens that are on the move?—can probably 
be explained by international agenda-setting. For a long time, 
IDPs received limited international attention, which has clearly 
contributed to increasing protracted displacement. The fear of 
being blamed for infringing on the sovereignty of a country 
also made international actors reluctant to intervene. With the 
help of the 2001 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-
ment, which however are legally not binding, this is gradually 
changing. 
Against this background, the tools and policies on international 
protection have so far not been successful in finding durable 
solutions and have thus not prevented displacement situations 
from becoming protracted to any significant extent. We see 
that national legislation is strongly influenced by international 
agenda-setting, with legislation on refugees more developed 
than legislation on IDPs. And in countries, where international 
refugee legislation is not ratified, the international commu-
nity—with UNHCR and the EU as the most emblematic 
actors—negotiates its way into a country through MoUs or 
cooperation agreements that enable UNHCR to carry out its 
mandate. It is remarkable to note that the African region—
through the African Union and the International Conference 
on the Great Lakes Region—has developed several legislative 
frameworks to regulate the issue of refugees and IDPs, whereas 
arrangements in the Middle East and Asia are mostly on a 
bilateral level or between governments and UNHCR. Despite 
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ment and relocation schemes have fallen dramatically below the 
current needs. Moreover, the lack of regulation of humanitarian 
visas and private sponsorship schemes at a European level are 
significant gaps in the EU’s international protection system.
Refugee legislation usually does not distinguish between 
different countries of origin of refugees and, consequently, the 
same treatment should apply to all refugees. In reality, however, 
exceptions are often created that apply to certain refugees, 
leading to differential treatment, for instance, of Palestinian, 
Iraqi and Syrian refugees in Jordan, which enables Palestinians 
not only to obtain citizenship but also to own property, whereas 
Syrian refugees may not. Such legal provisions contribute to 
Palestinian refugees being able to move around freely and to 
settle in a new place if this place is safer or provides better 
opportunities to make a living. At the same time, they limit the 
mobility of Syrian—and to a lesser extent Iraqi—refugees and 
make it more difficult for them to find a durable solution. 
In Ethiopia, Eritrean refugees—often young men—are treated 
differently from refugees from other neighbouring countries 
who usually flee in families. Eritrean refugees have more 
freedom to move around in the country and are seen to be 
culturally closer to Ethiopians. This contributes to higher levels 
of mobility among Eritreans. Refugees in Tanzania, in contrast, 
are supposed to stay within the designated camp areas, with 
limited possibilities to move around. IDPs in the Congo find it 
easier to move as they are citizens within their own country, but 
insecurity, roadblocks and poor infrastructure make it difficult 
for people to maintain mobile lifestyles.
In general, our findings show that the freedom of movement is 
quite limited for most refugee populations. This is especially 
the case in encampment contexts and hampers progress towards 
a durable solution out of protractedness. The examples men-
tioned above of the Eritrean and Palestinian refugees suggest 
that the limitations on mobility are a direct result of refugee 
policies and, when people have the freedom to move, they are 
keen to make use of it. Limitations on mobility imposed by 
displacement governance thus contribute to protracted dis-
placement.
These tensions, compounded by inconsistent and arbitrary 
asylum decision-making which can also be described as 
poor and unfair under many circumstances, are conducive 
to protracted displacement in the host country. With limited 
access to quick and fair asylum procedures and well-resourced 
social integration systems, international protection applicants 
and beneficiaries find themselves in host countries waiting for 
long periods of time for a definitive decision on their claims 
or facing very limited prospects of effectively integrating into 
the host country. These shortcomings should be addressed by a 
more effective enforcement of the current CEAS instruments by 
the European Commission, as well as by a thorough improve-
ment of these instruments in the current process of legislative 
reform in relation to the aspects pointed out above.
In the African and Asian contexts, refugees and IDPs are 
often seen as a responsibility of the humanitarian community. 
Durable solutions often sit uncomfortably with the nature of 
humanitarian aid provision, which has a short-term orienta-
tion to be able to respond to immediate needs. Development 
actors might be better positioned to work towards longer-term 
durable solutions, but often, displaced people are not a specific 
target group for their interventions, as we noted for instance in 
the case of the DRC, where development actors usually target 
‘vulnerable groups’ without distinguishing IDPs as a particular 
group. 
In short, we identified the need to pursue more forcibly the 
combination of humanitarian measures with more future-ori-
ented interventions, and to bridge the gap that exists between 
short-term humanitarian aid and more durable development 
policies and programmes. The exercise of rights and access 
to services needs to be ensured by implementing policies that 
place international protection claimants and beneficiaries—and 
their present and future needs and interests—more squarely at 
the forefront.
6.3		Uniform	legislation,	differential	treatment
The existence of a global international protection framework 
has not secured any degree of uniformity as to how interna-
tional protection claimants and beneficiaries are treated across 
regions. Even within the same region, as in Europe, differences 
are glaring. Against this background, policy and practitioners 
have so far only poorly understood and dealt with mobility and 
transnational dimensions of displacement. 
International protection seekers in the EU are not able to move 
anywhere outside the EU member state who has taken re-
sponsibility for the claim. Once they are granted international 
protection, family reunification is subject to criteria whose 
interpretation is not consistent or inclusive across the EU. 
Furthermore, there is no mutual recognition of international 
protection statuses among EU countries. Crucially, EU resettle-
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3.	 While global and regional frameworks set priorities, actual 
engagement is usually at the national or sub-national (re-
gional, local) levels and, at times, lead to contradictions 
between global priorities and local needs. To a certain 
extent, this is intuitive, especially for programmes focusing 
on development and host–refugee relations, as supra-na-
tional or regional approaches would likely be less effective 
because they would intrinsically become less tied to the 
local context and needs of the host communities. Targeted 
approaches to protracted displacement must be embedded 
in regional, national and local contexts to be effective. How-
ever, this can also be a hindrance and can limit impact and 
scope of the efforts, particularly when implementation at the 
national level translates into funding for traditional services 
or projects and when there is insufficient coordination with 
national development and humanitarian policies. Moreover, 
in many cases, especially in the Global South, national 
protection regimes are often strongly ‘upward’ oriented to-
wards the international community, but this does not neces-
sarily translate into a sustained focus on displaced people’s 
actual needs and the realisation of durable solutions.
4.	 Legal protection of refugees is more advanced than that 
of internally displaced persons, even though the latter 
group is much larger in the Global South. While global 
initiatives to protect IDPs remain non-binding and are not 
under the mandate of a specific institution, the African 
continent, with the Great Lakes Protocol and the Kam-
pala Convention, for instance, has made greater strides 
in protecting IDPs compared with other regions, possibly 
reflecting the relevance of IDPs for the region. IDPs on the 
continent outnumber the refugee population, and globally, 
Africa is the continent with the most IDPs. Such initiatives 
show the potential of normative frameworks adjusted to 
specific regional contexts, but other regions have yet to use 
this approach to address IDPs living in protracted displace-
ment. However, at the same time, these frameworks have 
not always been effectively implemented and operational-
ised at the domestic level. For example, the DRC and Ethi-
opia are two countries in our study that host large groups 
of internally displaced people, next to smaller groups of 
refugees, yet, this is not reflected in the extent and scope of 
laws and policies. Looking at protection regimes in place 
for refugees and IDPs, it is clear that priorities and agendas 
at the national law and policy level and the executive level 
are reflective of international priorities: Refugees receive 
more attention than IDPs, legislation is more elaborate (and 
binding rather than guiding) and has a longer history, and 
Conclusions
Our analysis of displacement governance across global, 
regional and domestic contexts leads us to the following ten 
conclusions.
1.	 Governance regimes have made important strides in 
addressing refugee issues in general and protracted dis-
placement specifically. This can be seen in terms of legal 
frameworks (especially through regional intergovernmental 
frameworks or regimes), but also broader donor engage-
ment frameworks, the latter especially key in recent years. 
Tripartite agreements have also been a particular strategy 
of UNHCR engagement with countries that host refugees 
and their countries of origin, and this applies across various 
regions. Moreover, in recent years, particularly since the 
New York Declaration and the follow-up work to it leading 
to the Global Compact for Refugees, more emphasis has 
been placed within regional approaches on improving social 
cohesion and host-refugee relations and promoting broader 
economic development in host communities. Nonetheless, 
while the Refugee Convention and UNHCR system have 
shown resilience throughout decades of dramatic political 
and social changes, it is clear that the current institutional 
and governance system has become much more complex 
and requires an ever-increasing degree of collabora-
tion, coordination and constant improvement between 
international, regional and domestic stakeholders. This 
is crucial to address protracted displacement situations 
much more effectively than so far. The Refugee Compact is 
unlikely to be a ‘gamechanger’.
2.	 Certain international actors, UNHCR, IOM and the 
World Bank and the EU in particular, have emerged as 
key players in setting the global, regional and domestic 
agendas under which projects and programmes are 
implemented, particularly in the Middle East, the Horn 
of Africa and East Africa regions. The EU and the World 
Bank mainly act as donors. UNHCR is the main interna-
tional actor on the stage of refugee policy, particularly in the 
Global South, so its role is more complex: It serves as agen-
da-setter (like under the Syrian 3RP or the CRRF), interloc-
utor on behalf of refugees (for instance through its trilateral 
agreements with host and origin states), and in countries 
such as Jordan and Pakistan, they even decide on status 
determination. In European and African countries, national 
authorities are in the driving seat when it comes to such 
decisions, but especially in African countries UNHCR—
and other international actors—still retain some leverage. 
Nonetheless, ownership of processes and resources is often 
fragmented, stakeholders struggle to control the whole pro-
cess and outcomes, and protracted displacement may grow.
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and externalisation of control agenda seem to overrule all 
other agendas (mobility, rights, livelihoods, etc.) that could 
contribute to improving protracted displacement. To coun-
teract this trend, the territorial understanding of protection 
underlining the Refugee Convention, and the international 
protection system more generally, should be redesigned to 
ensure that people can reach safe countries or regions inde-
pendently of their economic conditions and in consonance 
with their transnational links. The current debates around 
humanitarian visas, along with the possible introduction 
of private sponsorship schemes, could go to great lengths 
in addressing protracted displacement  both in Europe and 
elsewhere.
7.	 The changing nature of legislation and policy that not 
only contributes but also helps to alleviate, protracted 
displacement situations in individual countries reflects a 
shifting geopolitical landscape, the politicised nature 
of legislation and the influence of the media and public 
opinion. In this context, lack of compliance with interna-
tional and regional protection regimes—both in the Global 
North and the Global South—leads to gaps in protection 
in practice and contributes to the vulnerability of dis-
placed people. Although most countries are committed to 
abiding by international and regional standards, practice 
often looks different from policy and the law. The asylum 
decision-making process and the legal categories imposed 
on asylum-seekers, which dictate their ability to work, 
their place of residence, the available options for family 
reunification, and access to accommodation, education and 
healthcare, are hugely significant for the everyday lives of 
refugees and the (dis)continuation of their specific ‘trans-
local figuration of displacement’.
8.	 Durable solutions need to be better aligned with devel-
opment-oriented interventions. Looking at the type of 
policies and programmes in place to support IDPs and 
refugees, there is an unmistakable focus on humanitarian 
interventions. International and domestic humanitarian 
actors provide emergency aid. Such interventions almost  
inevitably compete with the longer-term development 
orientation that is needed to find sustainable solutions to 
protracted displacement. Initiatives such as the Jordan 
Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis are important steps to 
bridge the gap between the two worlds.
9.	 Although refugees can contribute to economic develop-
ment, their rights are often restricted to such an extent that 
the full development potential of refugee integration 
cannot be realised. Worse, such limitations to rights of 
refugees contribute to protracted displacement both in 
the Global North and Global South, even if much research 
shows that integration can contribute to economic devel-
opment for host countries as well. Limitations to settling 
interventions are more numerous. This lack of focus on 
IDPs is a key element that leads to a deepening and prolon-
gation of their displacement. Even if there were a stronger 
framework for IDPs, the very existence of IDPs points to 
a major problem of state fragility and capacity, and there 
are more complex issues around the addressees of norms 
protecting IDPs. Greater efforts need to be made to address 
these issues to support IDPs in protracted displacement. 
5.	 Regional blocs and unions such as the EU, COMESA, 
EAC, IGAD or ICGLR are particularly relevant players 
in the governance of protection and will continue to be as 
their regional frameworks and protocols are developed further. 
These frameworks, especially those related to freedom of 
movement and right to work across the region, will impact 
mobility within the region and access to rights and live-
lihoods by nationals within the region. However, their 
impact is still insufficient, and there is a constant risk of 
regressive policies that contribute to protracting rather than 
resolving displacement situations. Other regional integra-
tion processes in the Middle East and South Asia, led by the 
Arab League and Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), may have the potential to address protracted 
displacement, even if their relevance will depend on their 
enforcement powers.
6.	 The EU’s approach to forced displacement is charac-
terised by two competing policy frames: On the one 
hand, the EU emphasises the need to facilitate access to 
durable solutions and enhance the self-reliance of displaced 
populations, for instance by improving the link between 
humanitarian and development assistance. On the other, 
the EU promotes policies to address the root causes of 
displacement and irregular migration. It specifically aims to 
intervene ‘upstream’ and to prevent secondary movements. 
The root causes approach, in particular, became prevalent 
(again) with the 2015 EU–Africa Joint Valletta Action Plan, 
and it is also expected that the new Multiannual Financial 
Framework for 2021–2027 will have an even stronger 
focus on that area. At the same time, the cooperation with 
countries of origin or transit in areas of return, readmission 
and migration control creates those ‘situations of limbo’ as 
it limits displaced people’s possibilities for onward mo-
bility. Similarly, EU resettlement programmes promote the 
creation of transnational networks and the EU’s support for 
regional integration and free movement regimes support 
access to mobility as a livelihood strategy, which is at 
the same time limited by the externalisation of migration 
control and cooperation with third countries, driven by the 
logic of conditionality. As such, there us an area of tension 
between these two policy frames about the recognition 
of mobility and access to transnational networks as an 
element of displaced people’s livelihood strategies and for 
achieving durable solutions. In fact, the EU securitisation 
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freely, to moving around—sometimes even within the same 
country—or to seeking employment hinder the self-suffi-
ciency of displaced people and make local integration as a 
durable solution more difficult to realise. As a result, their 
dependency is prolonged. IDPs and refugees can, however, 
also be seen as contributors to the social and economic life 
in a receiving community or country. The potential of these 
contributions, which are frequently not only based on their 
locally available skills but also their translocal or trans-
national network relations, is underexplored. Disregard of 
these potentials also harms host–refugee relations.
10.	Finally, mobility and translocal livelihoods are significant 
strategies for displaced people but are often hampered by 
multiple restrictions, which again contribute to protracting 
rather than resolving displacement situations. Again, this 
is noticeable in the Global South, but also in the Global 
North, with Italy and Greece being cases in point. Mobility 
and translocal connectivity might be seen as a fourth 
durable solution to protracted displacement. Yet, people 
are hindered from being mobile as a result of limits on their 
right to freedom of movement, encampment and contain-
ment policies, restrictive visa and family reunification 
policies, as well as by inadequate housing conditions, poor 
infrastructure or insecurity. Consequently, whether mo-
bility is a serious option not only depends on a person’s own 
weighing of options but also to a large extent on contextual 
factors that the refugee/IDP does not control. Currently, 
efforts by policy and practice to support displaced people’s 
translocal and transnational networks are very limited, even 
though most people are displaced within their respective 
regions and often maintain strong networks. Displaced 
people’s own translocal connectivity remains an untapped 
resource to address the protracted nature of displacement 
more effectively.
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